The Battle over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries Being TRIPped by Developed Countries by Nerozzi, Michelle M.
Volume 47 Issue 3 Article 4 
2002 
The Battle over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing 
Countries Being TRIPped by Developed Countries 
Michelle M. Nerozzi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michelle M. Nerozzi, The Battle over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries Being 
TRIPped by Developed Countries, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 605 (2002). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss3/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2002]
Notes
THE BATTLE OVER LIFE-SAVING PHARMACEUTICALS:
ARE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BEING "TRIPped"
BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES?
I. INTRODUCTION
The issues of cost and access to HIV/AIDS drugs are of great impor-
tance to developing countries, as over eighty-nine percent of people cur-
rently living with HIV/AIDS reside in countries ranked in the lowest ten
percent in terms of Gross National Product.' In South Africa, HIV is
spreading faster than anywhere else in the world, with statistics showing
that the workforce is likely to be twenty percent HIV-positive by next year
and life expectancy will be reduced to thirty-eight by the year 2010.2 Even
the U.S. Surgeon General commented on the AIDS epidemic, comparing
it "to the plague that decimated the population of Europe in the Four-
teenth century."3 Advances in medical research have yielded significant
1. See Marcus Mabry, No Money, No Meds, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1999, at 32 (illus-
trating AIDS crisis in South Africa by pointing out that doctors fail to inform pa-
tients of treatments that could prolong life because patients do not make enough
money each week to afford such treatments); Margaret Duckett, Compulsory Licens-
ing and Parallel Importing: What Do They Mean? Will They Improve Access to Essential
Drugs for People Living with HIV/AIDS?, at http://www.icaso.org/docs/compulsory-
english.htm July 1999) (discussing HIV/AIDS crisis and ways to lessen gap in ac-
cess between developed and developing countries); see also Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Annual Report 2001-2002: New
Medicines New Hope: Industry Serves Through Innovation, at http://www.phrma.org/
publications/publications/annual2001 /innovation.phtml (last visited Sept. 28,
2001) (discussing problem of AIDS in Africa). "More than 30 million people
around the world are infected by AIDS-and 75 percent of them are in sub-
Saharan Africa." Id.
2. See Peter Hawthorne, A Blighted Generation; Southern Africa Has Been Most
Severely Hit by AIDS, Leaving Children Orphaned and the Workforce Depleted, TIME (Af-
rica), July 26, 1999, at 57 (commenting that HIV virus in South Africa "isn't an
epidemic, it's a disaster"). For a compelling account of the medical crises of Af-
rica, see Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War; U.S. Policy Keeps Prices
Prohibitive, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1999, at A01 ("(S]wimming in [Josphat] Ny-
akundi's spinal fluid- inflaming the lining of his brain, keeping him braced in his
Nairobi hospital bed against the flashing pain that comes with the slightest move-
ment-are rampaging cells of cryptococcal meningitis, an opportunistic infection
that means he has AIDS.").
3. See Patrick Bond, Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing and South African
Health Policy: Managing Confrontation with U.S. Firms and Politicians, 29 INrr'L J.
HEALTH SERVS. 4 (1999), at http://www.aidc.org.za/archives/pbond-pharmaceuti-
cal-pricing.html (relaying Arianna Huffington's poor press review of pharmaceuti-
cal companies' stance on compulsory licensing and quoting surgeon general on
AIDS epidemic). Huffington states that "[s]omeone should remind the vice presi-
dent that last year alone the three major AIDS-drug manufacturers-Glax-
(605)
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improvements in treating diseases, specifically HIV/AIDS, that were only
recently incurable. Nonetheless, these high priced drug cocktails are un-
available to those living with HIV/AIDS in developing countries.
4
The unavailability of essential pharmaceuticals has led to recent con-
troversy over the issue of compulsory licensing, specifically surrounding a
dispute between South Africa and the United States regarding South Af-
rica's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997
(Medicines Act). 5 The controversy centers around interpreting the Agree-
oWellcome, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Pfizer-made respectively, $4.43 billion,
$3.64 billion and $3.35 billion." Id.
4. See Judy Rein, International Governance Through Trade Agreements: Patent Pro-
tection for Essential Medicines, 21J. INT'L L. Bus. 379, 379 (2001) (discussing interna-
tionalization of infectious disease, increased globalization of economic
transactions and technological innovation regarding pharmaceutical regulation).
Hopefully, greater access to these essential medicines will emerge without broad
sacrifice of patent protection. See id. at 380-81 (noting that there must be balanc-
ing of interests between access to essential medicines and protection of intellectual
property rights); Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs and the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need
for Reform, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 404 (1991) (referring to benefit of compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals-i.e., providing access to needed anti-retroviral
drugs, only form of therapy available to HIV/AIDS patients); see also Vick, supra
note 2, at AO (highlighting fact that "[m]edical advances that stalled AIDS epi-
demic in the West are not reaching Africa largely because these countries and
their citizens face a stark choice: buy drugs at their market price, far beyond the
means of all but few Africans, or risk trade sanctions by the United States for buy-
ing or developing generic drugs at lower prices.").
5. See Sara M. Ford, Note & Comments, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under
the TRIPs Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 942
(2000) (noting that recent dispute involves South African Parliament and United
States Trade Representative (USTR) and centers around differing views of devel-
oped and developing countries on issue of international patent protection); see also
Duane Nash, South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of
1997, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485, 491-93 (2000) (providing that Medicines and
Related Substances Control Amendment Act, specifically section 10, authorizes
Minister of Health to permit compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals as means of
offering cheaper AIDS drugs to poor patients); see also Bond, supra note 3, at
http://www.aidc.org.za/archives/pbond-pharmaceutical-pricing.html (describ-
ing post-apartheid South African health policy under Medicines Act). "Rebuttals
by ... PhRMA typically-e.g. according to spokesperson Tom Bombelles-accuse
South Africa of theft: 'There are ways to make drugs available to the poor in a
country like South Africa. We need to look for economic answers to economic
questions ... and not say the answer to this economic question is we'll just steal
(patents)."' Id. The only limit on authorization is that the product must have
been initially marketed by the owner or with the owner's consent. See id. Specifi-
cally, section 10 of the Act provides the following clauses be inserted into South
Africa's Act 101 of 1965:
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the pub-
lic, and in particular may (a) determine that the rights with regard to any
medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts
in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market by the
owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent. The Minister may...
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in
composition, meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the
same proprietary name as that of another medicine already registered in
[Vol. 47: p. 605
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ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
and achieving the proper balance between strengthening protection of
intellectual property rights worldwide and supplying developing countries
with the pharmaceuticals they desperately need.
6
The developed country pharmaceutical industry has not only lobbied
in support of U.S. action, including the Special 301 initiative that removed
South Africa from the most favored member trade status, but has also be-
gun to pursue litigation against the South African government claiming
violations of the TRIPs Agreement. 7 While there are no court decisions
regarding TRIPs interpretation and compulsory licensing, heated debate
between developed and developing countries over the proper interpreta-
the Republic, but which is imported by a person other than the person
who is the holder of the registration certificate of the medicine already
registered and which originates from any site of manufacture of the origi-
nal manufacturer as approved by the counsel in the prescribed manner,
may be imported.
Id. at nn.43-44 (citing South African Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act, No. 90 § 10(a) (1997)).
6. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], ANNEX IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs], reprinted in IN-
TERNATIONAL PROPERTY LAw 591-618 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds.,
1997) (reprinting TRIPs); see also Ford, supra note 5, at 942 (noting divergent per-
spectives emerging on issue of compulsory licensing); Nash, supra note 5, at 485
(stating purpose of TRIPs was to strengthen protection of intellectual property
rights and noting disagreements between developed and developing countries
over intellectual property protection, specifically regarding pharmaceuticals and
compulsory licensing). For a detailed discussion of TRIPs, see infra notes 17-25
and accompanying text.
7. See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical Industry
Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alter-
natives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1075-93
(1996) (describing pharmaceutical industry maneuverings used to advance global
interests, specifically Special 301); RobertJ. Pechman, Note, Seeking Multilateral Pro-
tection for Intellectual Property: The United States "TRIPs" Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 179, 195-201 (1998) (highlighting development of Special 301 by
United States and its past and current uses). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
is the primary mechanism the United States uses to protect its exports from for-
eign unfair trade practices. See id. at 196 (describing development of Special 301).
In 1988, Congress extended the power to act on unfair trade through the Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act, creating mandates for the USTR to initiate
Special 301 procedures and retaliate when unfair trade practices could not be
cured through negotiations. See id.
"On June 30, the White House announced that four items, for which South
Africa had requested preferential tariff treatment.., be held in abeyance pending
adequate progress on intellectual property rights protection in South Africa." Id.;
see also Mabry, supra note 1, at 32 (noting provision attached to 1998 U.S. budget
proposing to block aid to South Africa); Vick, supra note 2, at A01 ("At the urging
of the U.S. pharmaceutical lobby, South Africa was placed on the '301 watch list,'
which is seen as a prelude to trade sanctions."). But see Mabry, supra note 1, at 32
(discussing South Africa's insistence that Medicines Act complies with interna-
tional standards and emphasizing that Western countries take same measures
when faced with same types of situations).
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tion of Article 31 of TRIPs, allowing compulsory licensing, has come to the
forefront in a lawsuit initiated by thirty-nine American pharmaceutical
companies against the South African Ministry. 8 While this lawsuit, which
would have been the first test of the TRIPs Agreement, settled before
reaching an international court, its ramifications will be lasting.9
8. See Frederick M. Abbott, Discontinuities in the Intellectual Property Regime: The
TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER
L. SyMP. J. 71, 71-72 (2001) (discussing industrialized country pharmaceutical in-
dustries' pursuance of litigation against South African government to stop it from
authorizing parallel importation, based on claims that government is violating
TRIPs); Ravi Nessman, South Africa Now Takes Spotlight in AIDS Fight, Hous. CHRON.,
Apr. 21, 2001, at A28 (discussing court battle between South Africa and Western
pharmaceutical companies; see also Oxfam, Policy Paper: Oxfam Update on South Afri-
can Court Case: South Africa vs. the Drug Giants, at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/
papers/safrica/safrica3.htm (Apr. 1, 2001) (highlighting background of litigation
and noting that on March 5, 2001, thirty-nine of world's largest pharmaceutical
companies instituted lawsuit against South Africa, challenging validity of 1997
Medicines Act). U.S. actions, specifically the Special 301 initiative, threaten to un-
dermine the WTO because the WTO TRIPs Agreement permits governments to
authorize parallel importation and grant compulsory licenses in order to regulate
public health. See Abbot, supra at 72 (noting that U.S. unilateral actions lead peo-
ple to believe that WTO is hostile to developing countries' health crises). Abbott
then points out the rationale for U.S. policy against compulsory licensing in for-
eign countries as the legal fiction of the "slippery slope"-that is, if South Africa
grants compulsory licenses to address its current health crisis, then there will be no
end to the granting of compulsory licenses. See id. (questioning "slippery slope"
arguments in light of current HIV/AIDS crisis); see also TRIPs, supra note 6, at 593-
94, 601, 602 (authorizing, through ambiguous language, parallel importation and
grants of compulsory licenses). This slippery slope argument derives from the lan-
guage of TRIPs. See id. (stating language of TRIPs). Article 8, for example, pro-
vides: "members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and tech-
nological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provi-
sions of this Agreement." Id. at 594; see also Griffin, supra note 4, at 403-05
(reviewing U.S. policy on compulsory licensing). But see Ford, supra note 5, at 943
(stating that "[w]hile disputes between the governments of developed nations
holding critical patents and governments with most of the pharmaceutical needs
are not new, the issue of compulsory licensing remains an unresolved matter").
9. See Ravi Nessman, Drug Firms Drop Lawsuit in South Africa; AIDS Activists Hail
Move, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 20, .2001, at Al (discussing pharmaceutical industry de-
cision to drop lawsuit against South African government and possible ramifications
of litigation). Mark Heywood of the Treatment Action Campaign stated that
"there is no doubt that [major pharmaceutical companies] have received a black
eye. And I think it will embolden people in developing countries around the
world to stand up for medicines that are affordable." Id. One ramification of the
lawsuit hinted at by Heywood is the negative public opinion of the pharmaceutical
companies. See id. (offering criticisms of Western pharmaceutical companies han-
dling of AIDS crisis). In fact, the companies came under intense pressure to back
down and watched their reputations battered as they were criticized for putting
profits above human health. See id. (offering criticisms of Western pharmaceutical
companies regarding AIDS crisis). In response to negative public opinion and in
an effort to save face, the companies that make AIDS medication now offer them
to developing countries at or below cost. See id. (providing that GlaxoSmithKline
offers antiretroviral Combivir to AIDS patients at only four dollars per day); see also
Nessman, supra note 8, at A28 (noting that court battle with drug companies
608 [Vol. 47: p. 605
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This Note discusses the current tension between developed and devel-
oping countries relating to TRIPs and compulsory licensing, and access to
expensive life-sustaining pharmaceuticals. Part II summarizes the TRIPs
Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), focusing on com-
brought South African government into new alliance with AIDS groups and hu-
manitarian organizations); Vick, supra note 2, at A01 (recognizing that humanita-
rian organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders and World Bank, have
attacked U.S. policy and lawsuit). But see Drug Induced Dilemma, ECONOMIST, Apr.
21, 2001, at Business (discussing public debate over how to get medicines to devel-
oping countries and fact that drug companies backed down from lawsuit). One
commentator suggests that the public should not hastily condemn the companies
because the lack of access to expensive medicines in developing countries is not
only due to high drug prices, but also poor-country governments failing to invest
in health care and developed country donors devoting little of their overseas budg-
ets to medical problems. See id. (explaining that besides high prices, other barriers
to AIDS drug therapies exist in developing countries). Moreover, the commenta-
tor noted the price cuts and donation programs of some pharmaceutical compa-
nies including Merck and Boehringer Ingelheim. See id. (suggesting that drug
companies treat drug access as public relations problem instead of good govern-
ance problem); see also Pfizer, Press Release: Pfizer to Offer Antifungal Medicine at No
Charge to HIV/AIDS Patients in 50 Least Developed Countries Around the World, at http:/
/www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/about/press/nochargediflucan.html (June 6, 2001)
(discussing Pfizer's actions in developing donation programs following end of liti-
gation). For example, the lawsuit was dropped on April 19, 2001, and on June 6,
2001, Pfizer announced a collaboration with the South African Ministry of Health
to offer Diflucan antifungal medicine to HIV/AIDS patients to treat two opportu-
nistic infections associated with the disease. See id. (reviewing Diflucan Partnership
and noting that 185 institutions in South Africa have begun to distribute medicine
through program). Furthermore, there are no dollar or time limits on this collab-
oration. See id. (providing that Pfizer will work until all patients have cheap and
easy access to Diflucan). On June 11, 2001, Pfizer announced plans to help con-
struct an AIDS medical training clinic in Africa in order to strengthen medical
infrastructure. See Pfizer, Press Release: African and Western Alliance to Build First
Large-Scale AIDS Medical Training Facility in Africa, at http://www.pfizer.com/pfizer-
inc/about/press/aidsfacility.html (June 11, 2001) (describing goals of clinic, in-
cluding strengthening medical infrastructure, replicating program across Africa
and putting more patients under antiretroviral treatment).
On June 25, 2001, Pfizer announced plans to fund a study in Uganda to deter-
mine the best community-based approaches for HIV/AIDS prevention. See Pfizer,
Press Release: Major Study in Uganda to Identify Community-Based Approaches for HIV/
AIDS Prevention, at http://www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/about/press/ugandas-
tudy.html (June 25, 2001) (discussing misunderstanding of complex global health
issue of HIV/AIDS, especially at community level). Oxfam also noted in their up-
date on the South African court case:
The publicity surrounding the court case intensified the price war on
anti-retroviral drugs both between the pharmaceutical giants, and be-
tween them and the generic drug companies. Large companies such as
Merck cut drug prices as they sought to recoup some public support, to
blunt the offers from generic-drug companies, and to stave off growing
public disquiet about patents on medicines.
Oxfam, supra note 8, at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/safrica/
safrica2.htm. While these programs are beneficial to, developing countries, one
must question the motives behind them and whether they will last after pharma-
ceutical companies regain public confidence. See id. (hinting that motive behind
donation is to regain public approval).
5
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pulsory licensing and dispute settlement.1 0 Specifically, compulsory li-
censing is defined and discussed as it applies under Article 31 of TRIPs."
Dispute settlement is discussed in light of the unique aspect of the WTO,
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which was created to resolve issues
arising under TRIPs. 12 Nevertheless, nations in dispute have thus far
failed to involve the DSB in problem resolution, and have instead opted to
reach agreements on their own terms. 13 Part III discusses the oppositional
stances of developed and developing countries on interpretation of
TRIPs.' 4 Part IV outlines already proposed solutions for interpreting the
TRIPs Agreement and proposals for resolving the tensions between devel-
oped and developing countries.1 5 Finally, Part V offers solutions to the
problem of access to essential AIDS drugs including modifying TRIPs to
allow compulsory licensing, developing an inquiry into what constitutes a
10. For an overview of TRIPs, see infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
11. For an overview of compulsory licensing, see infra notes 26-30 and accom-
panying text.
12. See Ford, supra note 5, at 943-44 n.8 (explaining Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) that exists under WTO). The DSB was established through the Understand-
ing on Dispute Settlement (DSU) to resolve issues arising under TRIPs. See id.
(discussing DSB).
13. See id. at 944, 967-74 (referring to failure of disputing countries to involve
DSB in conflict resolution and suggesting that this is because countries do not
want to damage relations with important trading nations). Ford notes that devel-
oping countries would have incentive to bring disputes to the DSB. See id. at 969
(stating that "developing nations present the best chance for challenging those
unilateral measures"). Ford states that:
By bringing a compulsory licensing dispute before the DSB, they stand to
gain legitimacy in their compulsory licensing schemes and international
recognition for paving the road for other developing nations and poten-
tial trading partners to create similar mechanisms. The only potential
harm in bringing the matter before the DSB is the potential risk of dam-
aging their relationships with important trading nations.
Id.; see also Bond, supra note 3, at http://www.aidc.org.za/archives/pbond-phar-
maceutical-pricing.html (explaining past U.S. bullying tactics regarding National
Drug Policy of Bangladesh). "In the early 1980s, a major challenge to pharmaceu-
tical industry power in Bangladesh-the prohibition of many nonessential drug
imports-was rolled back not only by the U.S. government's threat of foreign aid
cuts. Drug companies themselves refused to sell Bangladesh essential medicines
.... .Id.; see Rein, supra note 4, at 394-96 (noting that although TRIPs relies on
domestic enforcement of its procedures, members may pursue intergovernmental
dispute resolutions procedures through DSB and consultation procedures estab-
lished by DSU to promote settlement and allow for arbitration); see also Weissman,
supra note 7, at 1077 (noting as example of developed nation bullies, success of
U.S. pharmaceutical industry with USTR to exert pressure on developing countries
to adopt Western patent laws). See generally Robert E. Hudec, The New WrO Dispute
Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1
(1999) (describing foundations of dispute settlement procedure of WTO, present-
ing analysis of cases brought before DSB and examining proposals for change in
dispute settlement procedures).
14. For a further discussion of developed and developing countries' views on
the issue of compulsory licensing, see infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of already proposed solutions to pharmaceutical
access, see infra notes 55-122 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47: p. 605
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"national emergency" and proposing a test program that combines a num-
ber of already suggested solutions.
16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of TRIPs Agreement
The TRIPs Agreement was adopted as part of the Uruguay Round in
Marrakesh and signed on April 15, 1994.17 TRIPs is part of the WTO and
establishes minimum international standards regarding intellectual prop-
erty rights, but requires individual member countries to enact laws enforc-
ing those rights.' 8 Nonetheless, problems have arisen in countries that,
before TRIPs, did not require protection of pharmaceuticals.' 9
TRIPs was enacted because of efforts by developed countries, specifi-
cally the United States, for strict protection of intellectual property rights
in a globalizing world in which markets in developed countries are begin-
ning to rely heavily on technology.20 The agreement incorporates provi-
sions of the Paris Convention, Berne Convention and Washington Treaty,
which are major treaties adopted by the U.S. and other countries in favor
of intellectual property protection. 2 1 Additionally, TRIPs addresses the
shortcomings of these treaties. 22 For example, two criticized weaknesses
16. For a better solution to pharmaceutical access in developing countries,
see infra notes 123-80 and accompanying text.
17. See Ford, supra note 5, at 948 (noting development of TRIPs).
18. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 601-03 (outlining member's responsibilities re-
garding international patents; but also containing Article 31 exception for coun-
tries to violate TRIPs). For example, Article 28 addresses.the rights conferred to a
patent holder:
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a)
where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties
not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering
for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product; (b) where
the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not
having the owner's consent from the act of using the process, and from
the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for thesepur-
poses at least the product obtained directly by that process. 2. Patent
owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the
patent and to conclude licensing contracts.
Id.
19. See Pechman, supra note 7, at 182 (suggesting need for adoption of
stronger intellectual property rights than provided by past treaties). Pechman
notes that an inherent problem of the Paris Convention was that, although it pro-
vided for reciprocity of patent rights, there were no standards of protection and
member countries were only required to afford as much patent protection to other
members as they afforded to those seeking domestic patents. See id. (offering Bra-
zil and India as examples of reciprocity problem with Paris Convention).
20. For a further discussion on globalizing economies, see infra notes 48, 49
and 59 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the Paris Convention, which ap-
plies to patent protection, see infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
22. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 592 (requiring all members to adhere to patent
protection conferred in Paris Convention). Article 9 of TRIPs incorporates provi-
7
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of the Paris Convention were that it did not harmonize patent laws among
countries and it did not offer enforcement provisions, but acted merely as
"guiding principles that member countries may or may not adopt. '23
TRIPs was created to alleviate these weaknesses and regulate the degree of
intellectual property protection to which all members must apply.24 In
recognition of problems faced by developing member States, TRIPs allows
certain concessions including: extended transition periods for implemen-
tation of TRIPs provisions, exclusion of certain items from patentability,
compulsory licensing under certain conditions, parallel importation and
technical and financial cooperation in favor of developing and least-devel-
oped member states.
25
B. Overview of Compulsory Licensing
A compulsory license is ajudicial or governmental annulment of pat-
ent rights, depriving a patentee of a monopoly or "an involuntary contract
between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by
the state." 26 In other words, an inventor is issued a patent, conferring
exclusive rights to make, use and sell an original subject matter for a tem-
porary period.27 A compulsory license takes away the patentees exclusiv-
sions of the Berne Convention. See id. at 594 (relating to copyright protection).
Article 35 of TRIPs incorporates provisions of the Washington Treaty. See id. at 604
(relating to integrated circuit protection); see also George K. Foster, Comment,
Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection: The U.S. and India in
the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 285-87
(1998) (explaining meanings of Paris Convention, core principles of national
treatment and priority); John E. Giust, Noncompliance with TRIPs by Developed and
Developing Countries: Is TRIPs Working?, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 69, 72 (1997)
(noting that TRIPs adopted Articles 1 through 12 and 19 of Paris Convention es-
tablishing right of priority and national treatment of patent protection).
23. RobertJ. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and Inter-
national Trade in the TRIPs Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven ?,
47 BUFF. L. REv. 713, 737 (1999); see Foster, supra note 22, at 287-88 (noting no
remedies for violations of Paris Convention requirements and lack of degree of
protection members must afford patent rights).
24. See Giust, supra note 22, at 71 (emphasizing that TRIPs, unlike Paris Con-
vention, directly regulates degree of intellectual property protection which applies
to all members).
25. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 601-02, 615-16 (addressing concessions allowed
by TRIPs in light of developing countries implementation difficulties). The provi-
sions on parallel importation (Article 6) and technical cooperation (Article 67)
are outside the main scope of this Note and therefore are only briefly mentioned.
26. Nash, supra note 5, at 489; see Rosemary Sweeney, Comment, The U.S. Push
for Worldwide Patent Protection for Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating
Collision, 9 PAc. RiM L. & POL'YJ. 445, 450 (2000) (defining compulsory licensing
in discussing limits of patent protection); see also Ford, supra note 5, at 945 (discuss-
ing compulsory licensing).
27. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 3 (Anthony D'Amato &
Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997) (supplying definition of patent and rights con-
ferred); Rein, supra note 4, at 380-81 (discussing patent scheme as part of global
trade regime); Weissman, supra note 7, at 1071 (identifying logic underlying crea-
612 [Vol. 47: p. 605
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss3/4
ity, allowing others to make, use and sell the subject matter before the
period expires.2 8
Article 31 of TRIPs appears to allow countries to grant compulsory
licenses in limited circumstances. This provision, however, contains am-
biguous language that developed and developing countries read differ-
ently.29 As one commentator notes, "[w]ithout terming it such, TRIPs
allows for compulsory licensing amidst several provisions in Article 31."3o
C. Overview of the Dispute Settlement Process
In 1994, members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), dissatisfied with its informally structured organization, created
the WTO, a formal international organization, to administer its proce-
dures.3 1 Arguably, the most important feature resulting from the WTO
was its official dispute settlement procedure, set out in an agreement
called the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (DSU), establishing the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB);
the DSB was an attempt by the WTO to "clean up" the ambiguity of
GATT's old dispute settlement process.3 2 This creation coincided with the
adoption of TRIPs and, as a result, TRIPS agreement standards are sup-
tion of patents as balance between public knowledge and protection for innova-
tions to maintain creativity incentive).
28. See Ford, supra note 5, at 945 (describing compulsory licensing as applied
to international intellectual property rights); Griffin, supra note 4, at 403-04 (ex-
plaining compulsory licensing and scheme suggested by members of Congress for
allowing compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals in United States). The scheme
suggested was entitled the Public Health Price Protection Act of 1972 and would
have required patent holders to license drugs to generic manufacturers on a roy-
alty basis, to be determined by the FTC; however, this legislation never became law.
See id. (discussing scheme).
29. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 602 (providing ambiguities as to legality of com-
pulsory licensing under Article 31); see also Abbott, supra note 8, at 73-77 (discuss-
ing legality of compulsory licensing under TRIPs).
30. Ford, supra note 5, at 949; see Weissman, supra note 7, at 1113-15 (sug-
gesting that Article 31 authorizes countries to use compulsory licensing, but also
noting that provisions 31 (f) and 31(h) may create obstacles to compulsory licens-
ing program).
31. See Hudec, supra note 13, at 4 (discussing history of GATT dispute proce-
dures). "[D]uring the first thirty years of GATT history ... [i]ts operating proce-
dures were quite ill-defined, its legal rulings were written in vague language that
suggested more than it said, and both its procedures and its rulings left plenty of
room for negotiation." Id.; see also Pechman, supra note 7, at 187-88 (noting that
DSU improved old system by guaranteeing right to panel, adopting panel report in
absence of consensus to reject, establishing appellate review and placing time lim-
its on compliance).
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posed to be enforced through the DSU. 33 Thus, it is important to under-
stand how the dispute process is used. 34
The dispute settlement process under the WTO occurs in twelve
stages, beginning with consultation among disputing countries and culmi-
nating in rulings made by a panel, which are subsequently adopted, re-
jected or appealed by the WTO members.3 5 It must be stressed, however,
that priority is to settle disputes through consultation. 36 If consultation
fails, then the DSU prefers that members resort to the DSB instead of
taking unilateral action against the non-complying country.37 The pre-
mise of the DSU is the same as earlier GATT procedures, but it expands
settlement powers in four ways: (1) it confers the right to bring complaints
before a dispute settlement board; (2) it makes board rulings binding on
all parties; (3) it introduces appellate review; and (4) it confers the right to
automatic trade sanctions when the losing party fails to comply with a legal
ruling.38
This process is important to member countries of TRIPs because,
while a council for TRIPs will monitor agreements between countries, the
DSU provisions of GATT apply to consultation and dispute settlement
under TRIPs. 39 These aspects of dispute settlement under TRIPs are help-
33. See Pechman, supra note 7, at 179 (noting TRIPs binding minimum stan-
dards of intellectual property protection enforceable through DSB of WA/TO). But
see id. (providing that U.S. will be forced to rely on unilateral action to enforce
TRIPs because DSU is inadequate process).
34. See generally Hudec, supra note 13 (outlining dispute settlement procedure
of DSU).
35. See World Trade Organization, Trading Into the Future: The Introduction to
the WTO: Settling Disputes, the WJFO's "Most Individual Contribution", at http://www.
wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif~e/displ e.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001)
(highlighting various stages of Dispute Settlement through WTO). Settling dis-
putes is the responsibility of the DSB (the General Council of GATT in another
guise) and the dispute settlement process takes place in twelve stages. Id.
36. See id. at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/tife /displ_e.
htm (stressing consultation by stating "By July 2000, 32 out of 203 cases had been
settled 'out of court', without going through the full panel process.").
37. See Hudec, supra note 13, at 3 (explaining how settlement procedures are
expanded under DSU).
38. See Pechman, supra note 7, at 202 (describing why U.S. Special 301 may be
viewed as GATT violation). Pechman discusses why developing countries were re-
luctant to sign the TRIPs Agreement, but states that, "by agreeing to TRIPs, other
countries were in effect attempting to ensure that the United States would be pre-
cluded from implementing such methods of unilateral coercion in the future." Id.
Thus, the other countries believed that taking unilateral action against a country
was a direct violation of TRIPs. See id. (discussing defense mechanism of TRIPs to
safeguard developing countries from retaliatory attacks formerly used by United
States to coerce intellectual property protection).
39. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 615 (incorporating provisions of GATT for dis-
pute settlement). Article 64 states that the "provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII
of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding
shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement."
Id.; see also Richard H. Marschall, Patents, Antitrust and the WTO/GATT: Using TRIPS
As a Vehicle for Antitrust Harmonization, 28 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1165, 1187-88
[Vol. 47: p. 605
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ful in that their goal is to settle conflicts through negotiation. 40 Thus,
dispute settlement under TRIPs is important in dealing with the tensions
between developed and developing countries over interpretation of
TRIPs, specifically any litigation arising out of those tensions.4 1
III. TENSIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH
RESPECT TO INTERPRETING TRIPs
The ambiguous language in TRIPs articles led to a rise in tension be-
tween developed and developing countries over proper interpretation. 42
Developed countries tend to view TRIPs narrowly, while developing coun-
tries view it broadly. 43 These differing views resulted in developed country
pharmaceutical companies bringing suit against the South African govern-
ment based on South Africa's interpretation of TRIPs to include compul-
sory licensing under its Medicines Act.
44
A. View of Developed Countries
Developed countries, specifically the United States, interpret the
TRIPs Agreement narrowly, proposing to give more control to the patent
holder.4 5 The view advanced by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manu-
(1997) (suggesting that TRIPs patent protection standards, are similar to those of
Paris Convention and other prior agreements, except for inclusion of multilateral
dispute settlement procedure and forum for negotiations, which are novel to
TRIPs).
40. See World Trade Organization, supra note 35, at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/displ-e.htm (providing that main goal in dispute
settlement process is negotiation).
41. For a further discussion of tensions between developed and developing
countries over interpretation of TRIPs, see infra notes 42-54 and accompanying
text.
42. For a further discussion of developed countries' narrow interpretation of
TRIPs, see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
developing countries' broad interpretation of TRIPs, see infra notes 51-54 and ac-
companying text.
43. For a discussion of the divergent views of developing and developed coun-
tries, see infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
44. For a brief discussion of the litigation against South Africa, see supra notes
5-9 and accompanying text.
45. See Weissman, supra note 7, at 1075 (noting pharmaceutical industry's at-
tempt, before signing of TRIPs, to persuade developing countries to adopt strict
regulation of patents). Pharmaceutical companies exerted heavy pressure on U.S.
policy makers to coerce developing countries into adopting U.S.-style patent laws.
See id. (discussing tactics of pharmaceutical companies, including acquisition of
seats on government advisory boards). Examples of this include "officials from the
PMA, Pfizer and Immunon Technologies join [ing] a technical advisory committee
to the USTR on intellectual property rights. Officials from DuPont, Monsanto and
Proctor & Gamble... [also] serv[ing] on the same committee." Id. at 1076; see also
Foster, supra note 22, at 298 (describing pharmaceutical industry campaign to
make protection of intellectual property rights priority of U.S. trade policy). Phar-
maceutical companies began making campaign donations including more than
$8.5 million to House and Senate candidates and $1.7 million to the 1992 presi-
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facturers of America (PhRMA), of which most large U.S. pharmaceutical
companies are members, states: "In an environment of strong protection
for patent rights, TRIPs provides limited exceptions where, in cases of ex-
treme urgency, compulsory licensing may complement generally high
levels of protection. Unfortunately, at this time, these conditions do not
prevail in countries where compulsory licensing is practiced. '4 6 In fact,
the United States has threatened to curtail economic aid programs and to
impose trade sanctions on the governments of South Africa and Thailand,
among others, for adopting or preparing to adopt measures to allow them
to address their health care crises, including broadly interpreting TRIPs to
allow compulsory licensing and other forms of loose patent protection.47
The United States takes this position because its economy is increasingly
dential election. See id. (describing pharmaceutical industry campaign to make
protection of intellectual property rights priority of U.S. trade policy); see also Ab-
bott, supra note 8, at 72 (stating that "U.S. government and the pharmaceutical
industry are invoking the TRIPs Agreement to impede governments [of develop-
ing countries] from taking actions that are urgently needed to save lives"). Abbott
then outlines the rationale behind those opposed to a reading of the TRIPs Agree-
ment to permit compulsory licensing. See id. (labeling pharmaceutical industry's
rationale as legal fiction of "slippery slope"). Nevertheless, Abbott notes that al-
though pharmaceutical countries intensely lobbied, they lost the battle "to prevent
the TRIPs Agreement from incorporating permissive rules on parallel trade and
compulsory licensing." Id.; see alsoJohn A. Harrelson, Note, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property
Rights and Compassion, 7 WIDENER L. SvMP. J. 175, 188-92 (2001) (offering analysis
of U.S. position against compulsory licensing). Members abiding by TRIPs, al-
though not required, have the option of negotiating stricter intellectual property
rights. See id. (discussing USTR policy of threatening loss of U.S. trade unless
developing country does not use compulsory licensing and outlining reasons be-
hind the policy, including lack of innovation leading to production of lower qual-
ity drugs). Harrelson argues that the United States contradicts itself because
several U.S. statutes call for compulsory licensing, particularly to the military. See
id. at 191 ("[T]he United States government can issue a compulsory license for air
pollution control patents, for nuclear power patents, for public health related pat-
ents, and for items needed for government use.").
46. PHRMA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2001 103-04 (2001) (offering
narrow interpretation of TRIPs provisions concerning compulsory licensing and
explaining negative impacts of compulsory licensing), available at http://www.
phrma.org/publications/publications/profile0l /chapter8.phtml.
47. See Abbott, supra note 8, at 72 (noting that developing countries may have
won legal battle regarding compulsory licensing, but it hurt them economically
and politically). Abbott eludes to the fact that developing countries may decide to
disregard TRIPs. See id. ("The decision by the United States government to use its
economic power as a weapon against developing countries fighting a battle against
a deadly plague would plausibly lead developing country government officials and
common citizens to question the economic, social and political foundations of the
TRIPs Agreement."). The United States also opposes reading TRIPs to allow paral-
lel importing, another method used by developing countries to provide cheap ac-
cess to pharmaceuticals. See Duckett, supra note 1, at http://www.icaso.org/docs/
compulsoryenglish.htm ("[I]mporting consists of purchasing proprietary drugs
from a third party in another country, rather than directly from the manufacturer,
and taking advantage of the fact that pharmaceutical companies sometimes charge
significantly lower prices in one country than another."). Parallel importing is
outside the scope of this Note.
[Vol. 47: p. 605
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moving away from basic manufacturing and toward high-technology indus-
tries, including biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. 48 Thus, the impor-
tance of intellectual property is a key concern. 49 The United States also
believes that compulsory licensing is not the solution because it has nega-
tive outcomes, including decreased access to medicines in developing
countries.
50
B. View of Developing Countries
Developing countries, including South Africa, India and Thailand, in-
terpret TRIPS broadly, proposing less control to the patent holder because
these countries traditionally did not offer strong (or any) protection to
intellectual property in the pharmaceutical area.5 1 For example, before
48. See Michael L. Doane, TRPs and International Intellectual Property Protection
in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 465 (1994)
(noting growth and development of international market over last twenty-five
years, specifically in technology-based industries, including pharmaceuticals). A
result of this growth is that these products have become a vital part of the U.S.
economy, with international trade .of these products accounting for five percent of
the United States Gross National Product. See id. (noting that American innova-
tors suffer from inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in foreign
countries)."It is estimated that worldwide losses to U.S. industries from piracy and
other forms of intellectual property right infringement exceed $60 billion annu-
ally." Id. at 466.
49. See Foster, supra note 22, at 297-98 (discussing dependence of U.S. econ-
omy upon innovators in pharmaceutical industry to narrow trade deficit since shift
to high-technology manufacturing, and emphasizing innovators' dependency on
strong patent protection to recoup R&D costs; thus, allowing more pharmaceuti-
cals to reach market); Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of Na-
tional Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 769, 770-71 (1997) (describing ways in which national intellectual prop-
erty norms can be fused into globalizing international trade markets and noting
that intellectual property rights are global commodities).
50. See PHRMA, supra note 46, at 103 (illustrating drawbacks of compulsory
licensing). Canada, for example, implemented legislation in the 1970s that per-
mitted compulsory licensing. See id. As a result, research and development de-
creased rapidly and did not increase until Canada made its compulsory licensing
provisions TRIPs compliant. See id. at 104 ("Subsequent to the strengthening of
the patent system, R&D expenditures increased by over 700 percent during 1987-
98, and the ratio of R&D spending to sales doubled during the same period.").
51. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 594, 601-02 (offering exceptions to imposing
TRIPs minimum standard intellectual property rights). Article 8, section 1 states
that "[im] embers may adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition...
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this agreement."
Id. at 594 (emphasis added). Article 27 offers a public health exception to patenta-
bility: "Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre
public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health ...
provided such exclusion is not made merely because exploitation is prohibited by
their law." Id. at 601. Article 31, entitled Other Use Without Authorization of the
Right Holder, states:
Where the law of a member allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the
government, the following provisions shall be respected: ... (b) such use
13
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adopting TRIPs, developing member States, such as India, deliberately re-
moved the pharmaceutical industry from the patent system, choosing in-
stead to protect the industry by imposing tariffs on bulk drugs.
52
Developing countries additionally argue that they do not have the capacity
or resources to currently maintain high-technology industries and that
their citizens cannot afford expensive medications. 53 Thus, these nations,
may be only permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable com-
mercial terms .... This requirement may be waived by a member in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
Id. at 602 (emphasis added). Developing countries use Articles 27 and 31 as the
crux of their argument for allowing loose protection to pharmaceutical patent
holders in light of the HIV/AIDS crisis. See Weissman, supra note 7, at 1099-1116
(using public health provision of Article 27 to conclude that countries can deny
patents on drugs as long as reasons are legitimate and applying Article 31 to sup-
port compulsory licenses that meet criteria); see also Harrelson, supra note 45, at
190-92 (noting that compulsory licensing can decrease cost of pharmaceuticals in
developing countries by over seventy-five percent with no significant loss in prof-
its). Harrelson gives an example in India, where "one can obtain a two dollar
generic form of Pfizer's patented fluconazole, an AIDS related meningitis drug,
that originally cost seventeen dollars." Id. at 190-91.
52. See Giust, supra note 22, at 95-96 (explaining India's past treatment of
pharmaceutical patenting as example of why high levels of intellectual property
protection may not be in best interests of developing countries, but also noting
that TRIPs requires developed members to cooperate, both financially and techni-
cally, with needs of least developed countries). In India, before the signing of
TRIPs, pharmaceuticals were not offered patent protection, and "the result [was]
that Indian manufacturers of bulk drugs and formulations not only dominate [d]
the Indian market, but [were] among the most competitive in the world, especially
with regard to production of generic drugs." Id. at 95. Giust notes that some
scholars believe TRIPs will cause India to invest more in R&D to develop a more
competitive drug sector. See id. (citing MartinJ. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects
and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPs Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 530 (1996)). Nonetheless, Giust cites the pharmaceutical in-
dustry in Italy as an example of TRIPs hurting developing countries. See id. at 96
(noting Italy's industry was thriving before TRIPs and now is fairing poorly); see
also Harrelson, supra note 45, at 176 (explaining that intellectual property protec-
tion is not culturally accepted by many developing countries, particularly based on
their sense of community). The cultural aspects of intellectual property rights are
outside the scope of this Note, but for an elegant discussion on the developing
countries' cultural arguments against strict protection of intellectual property
rights, see Gutowski, supra note 23, at 744-52 (supplying fears of developing coun-
tries of Western economic and moral imperialism). Gutowski notes one critic's
explanation of the inconsistency of Western individualism and developing coun-
tries ideals of community:
Most Third World societies are organized around a social unit, which ex-
tends certainly beyond the individual and, in most cases, beyond the nu-
clear family. The forms and very definition of ownership are thus crafted
in a way opposite to property conceptions of western legal and economic
structures central to the development of private and public law.
Id. at 747 (quoting Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Impli-
cations of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'V
109, 136 (1995)).
53. See Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPs
Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the Patentability
14
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in light of the AIDS crisis, must use compulsory licensing as a way to offer
cheaper medications.5 4
IV. ANALYSIS OF SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY OTHERS
Many scholars have proposed solutions to undercut tensions created
by ambiguities in TRIPs. 55 These solutions include: allowing a narrow in-
terpretation of TRIPS; allowing a broad interpretation of TRIPs; leaving
interpretation matters to the DSB; implementing direct price control; us-
ing a pooled procurement scheme; and utilizing planned donation pro-
grams.56 Some of these proposals are more viable and accepted than
others.57 None of the proposals, however, offer a country such as South
Africa a long-term solution to the AIDS crisis. 58
of Biotechnology, 6J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 52-57 (1998) (offering developing coun-
tries' concerns over patent protection for biotechnology inventions). Strong intel-
lectual property standards are inappropriate in developing countries both because
of their economic systems and the costs of implementing strong patent rights. See
id. at 54-56 (advancing that intellectual property standard of developed countries
assumes existence of marke t-based economies with open trade, which most devel-
oping countries do not have). McCabe also notes the costs of implementing a
sophisticated intellectual property system. See id. at 55 (discussing how strong pat-
ent system will cost developing countries much money to support economic
growth predicted by developed countries, including money that should be spent
on developing infrastructure).
54. See Robert Weissman, AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to
Essential Medicines, at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol4/
v4n23aids-body.html (August 1999) (describing lack of medical infrastructure in
African countries); see also Claire Bisseker, SA in Race to Develop an Affordable Vaccine
AIDS Research, FIN. MAIL (South Africa), Feb. 5, 1999, at 38 (discussing South Afri-
can AIDS Vaccine Initiative, which will rely on funding from government, business
and international donor community to promote better medical infrastructure and
allow patients to receive affordable AIDS medications). But see Harrelson, supra
note 45, at 177 (reviewing compulsory licensing and suggesting that compulsory
licensing is not solution to high pharmaceutical costs in some developing coun-
tries because of lack of sufficient manufacturing resources). See generally Haw-
thorne, supra note 2 (describing lack of medical infrastructure in African
countries, where some patients have to supply their own drugs, bedding and
nurses and noting that governments do not have money, facilities or manpower to
cope with AIDS). Countries with an adequate infrastructure and technology will
benefit from compulsory licensing, but in less developed countries, such as sub-
Saharan Africa, compulsory licensing will not make drugs more affordable. See
Harrelson, supra note 45, at 192 (noting that least developed countries do not have
sophistication or money to manufacture and distribute HIV drugs, even with use of
compulsory licensing).
55. For a discussion of proposed solutions intended to remedy the current
tensions between developed and developing countries, see infra notes 56-122 and
accompanying text.
56. For a discussion of proposed solutions for interpreting TRIPs and al-
lowing better access to essential AIDS pharmaceuticals, see infra notes 57-122 and
accompanying text.57. For a discussion of the viability of proposed solutions, see infra notes 74-
75, 82-86, 90-93, 98-104, 111-14, 119-22 and accompanying text.
58. For a discussion of long-term solutions, see infra notes 123-80 and accom-
panying text.
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A. Allowing a Narrow Interpretation of TRIPs
Some commentators have proposed to allow the narrow interpreta-
tion of TRIPs held by the developed countries, thereby giving more con-
trol to patent holders in a globalizing international economy.5 9 The main
reason advanced is that inadequate patent protection will impede research
and development in the pharmaceutical industry.60 "The U.S. Govern-
ment estimated in 1990 that it cost an average of $359 million and took
ten to twelve years to bring just one new pharmaceutical compound to the
market."6 1 Shannon S.S. Herzteld, Senior Vice President of International
59. For a discussion of the view of developed countries, see supra notes 45-50
and accompanying text.
60. See Foster, supra note 22, at 297-98 (noting dependence of pharmaceutical
companies on strong intellectual property rights to recoup R&D costs). The
United States is comfortable in protection of intellectual property rights at home,
with its main concern stemming from incidences of piracy by foreign countries.
See id. (discussing adverse effects on pharmaceutical sales and R&D efforts caused
by foreign pirates). "United States pharmaceutical innovators generally have more
than 40% of their sales in foreign markets, but government agencies have esti-
mated that innovators lose . . . $5 billion annually in revenue from sales lost to
foreign copiers." Id.; see also Griffin, supra note 4, at 368 (observing market of
pharmaceutical industry and noting that Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion has over one hundred member firms, which devoted over sixteen percent of
their sales, or $7.3 billion, to R&D in 1989); McCabe, supra note 53, at 47-50 (ex-
plaining special characteristics of biotechnology industry and noting that only one
in five thousand prospective drugs is good enough to reach market and those that
do are highly susceptible to piracy, which results in cheap and simple replication,
causing pharmaceutical industry to suffer massive economic losses). McCabe states
that:
The biotechnology industry, as all industries, is regulated by two funda-
mental economic theories. First, as rational actors, biotechnology compa-
nies will seek to maximize their investment return. Second, because
investors are risk averse, they would be less willing to invest in biotechnol-
ogy if they are not guaranteed adequate patent protection. Although the
aim of the biotechnology industry is to alleviate the world's health
problems, "[w]e need to remember that health care, at least in the
United States, is part of our society's free-market economic system," and
therefore it is motivated by profit.
Id. at 48-49. But see Griffin, supra note 4, at 392-97 (questioning R&D and cost of
drugs, particularly AZT costs of $8,000-$10,000 per patient). The cost would not
seem so substantial, considering the estimation of $231 million supposedly spent
on R&D, but the government conducted pre-clinical and clinical trials and contin-
ues to support research on the drug, leading one to wonder why the price is so
high if the government is sponsoring the R&D. See id. at 393 (noting discrepancies
between where companies get money for R&D and how much they charge patients
for drugs in order to "recoup their R&D costs"); Duckett, supra note 1, at http://
www.icaso.org/docs/compulsoryenglish.htm (suggesting that patients in poor
countries should not pay for R&D costs because they are only small portion of
global pharmaceutical market). Duckett advances the same argument as Griffin in
questioning whether drug prices are related to replacement of R&D costs, focusing
on Pentamidine, whose cost increased by five hundred percent once it was discov-
ered that it could treat AIDS-related diseases. See id. (discussing original use of
Pentamidine as cheap treatment for sleeping sickness).
61. Foster, supra note 22, at 297. But see Bond, supra note 3, at http://
www.aidc.org.za/archives/pbondpharmaceutical-pricing.html (citing studies that
[Vol. 47: p. 605
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Affairs at PhRMA stated that, "for every 15,000 compounds that you look
at, three become medicines. Of those three, one makes a profit .... -62
Furthermore, a 1994 World Bank study determined that eighty-six to one
hundred percent of developed country pharmaceutical companies re-
ported that their decision whether to invest or not invest in a country de-
pends significantly on the amount of patent protection afforded by that
country. 6 3
Developed countries raise three other secondary issues arising out of
allowing broad interpretation of TRIPS: (1) the concessions already
granted to developing countries in the TRIPs Agreement; (2) the misuse
and abuse of drugs in developing countries; and (3) the fear that peoples
of developing nations will sell the cheaper pharmaceuticals on the black
market back to developed countries at cheaper prices. 64 The concessions
argument advanced by the United States is that TRIPs already gives devel-
oping countries too much leeway for becoming TRIPs compliant. 65 First,
illustrate large share of R&D covered by U.S. government). Scientists from the
National Institute of Health (NIH) stated on the development of AZT:
The Sept. 16 letter from T.E. Haigler Jr., president of the Burroughs
Wellcome Company, was astonishing in both substance and tone. Mr.
Haigler asserts that azidothymidine, or AZT, was essentially discovered
and developed entirely by Burroughs Wellcome with no substantive role
from Government scientists and Government-supported research ....
Indeed, one of the key obstacles to the development of AZT was that
Burroughs Wellcome did not work with live AIDS virus nor wish to re-
ceive samples from AIDS patients. In a number of specific ways, Govern-
ment scientists made it possible to take a drug in the public domain with
no medical use and make it a practical reality as a new therapy for AIDS.
It is unlikely that any drug company could have found a better partner
than the Government in developing a new product.
Id.
62. Harrelson, supra note 45, at 190.
63. See PHRMA, supra note 46, at 105 ("[T]he strength or weakness of a coun-
try's system of intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect,
particularly in high-technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred
by many U.S. firms to that country.").
64. See David P. Fidler, Perspectives on Globalization from Developing States: Neither
Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health in the Developing World, 7 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 209-12 (1999) (explaining downside to compulsory
licensing through problems of developing countries abusing antimicrobial HIV/
AIDS drugs because of weak public health infrastructure, but attributing weak in-
frastructure to impacts of globalization); see also International Intellectual Property
Institution (IIPI), HIV/AIDS Pilot Project: To Deliver Patented Therapies & Other Treat-
ments to Patients in Developing Countries, at http://www.iipi.org/eng/projects/
aids.asp (last visited Aug. 31, 2001) (discussing various drawbacks of allowing com-
pulsory licensing, including undermining innovation, not addressing affordability
of drugs and causing formation of gray or black markets). Today, absence of pat-
ent protection is not providing inexpensive or effective access to patients who need
them because the sophistication of manufacture and distribution of AIDS drugs is
beyond both the financial and infrastructural means of developing countries. See
id. (commenting on need for balancing innovation and investment with patient
costs).
65. See Pechman, supra note 7, at 190-93 (setting forth concerns of United
States regarding concessions granted under TRIPs to developing countries).
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TRIPs' Articles 65 and 66 allow developing countries extended transition
periods for compliance. 66 Second, commentators argue that public policy
exceptions to compliance conferred by Article 27 are broad escape clauses
that a country can invoke without meeting specific standards. 67 Devel-
oped countries feel they should not have to concede anything else under
TRIPs.
The misuse and abuse argument centers on the poor medical infra-
structure of developing countries and their lack of control over prescrip-
tion and distribution of drugs, thereby leading to the development of
resistant strains of HIV.68 The lack of poor medical infrastructure is illus-
trated not only by the deteriorating health care systems, but also by the
lack of HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention programs. 69 Even with easy
and cheap access to antiretroviral drugs, who is to say that the people in
66. See id. at 190-91 (noting date for full compliance with TRIPs wasJanuary 1,
1996, with developing countries receiving an extension period until January 1,
2000). Nevertheless, developing countries that did not recognize patenting rights
for pharmaceuticals before TRIPs are allowed five years beyond extension period
to fully implement patent protection. See id. (noting that most developing coun-
tries will not fully implement TRIPs patent protection until at least 2005). Devel-
oped countries believe these extensions are too long and will lead governments to
encourage piracy rather than implement TRIPs. See id. at 191 (suggesting that
developing countries have no incentive to protect international intellectual prop-
erty rights); see also TRIPs, supra note 6, at 613-15 (conferring transition periods on
developing and least developed countries in Articles 65 and 66, including allowing
them to delay compliance with TRIPs until at least 2005); Emily Miao, TPJPs Agree-
ment Impacts Pharmaceutical Sector, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 2000, at ClI (noting that de-
veloping countries do not feel benefits of increased international trade under
WTO and TRIPs, but also noting extensions of transition periods under TRIPs).
67. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 601 (allowing members to exclude from patent
protection inventions whose exploitation is necessary to protect human health); see
also Pechman,.supra note 7, at 192 (arguing that "escape clause" will be too easily
invoked by developing countries). Pechman believes the concessions included in
TRIPs were used as a means of attracting developing countries to sign the agree-
ment. See id. at 193 (offering opinion that developing countries will use conces-
sions to gain competitive edge over developed countries through piracy).
68. See Fidler, supra note 64, at 212 (connecting development of HIV therapy
resistant strains to non-existent regulatory controls over antimicrobial use).
69. See Nessman, supra note 8, at A28 (noting criticisms of South African Pres-
ident Thabo Mbeki that he listens to those who argue AIDS does not exist and if it
does, then HIV does not cause it). Health department officials in South Africa
have recognized the lack of an adequate medical infrastructure. See id. (suggesting
that even at reduced prices, South Africa can neither afford nor distribute
medicine without outside assistance); see also Vick, supra note 2, at AOI (providing
as example of inadequate medical infrastructure leading Nairobi public hospital,
which refuses to admit opportunistic meningitis patients unless patients provide
their own medicine because hospital has no supply). But see Hawthorne, supra
note 2, at 57 (explaining that, in spite of South Africa's sophisticated industrial
infrastructure, there is not enough money, manpower or material to cope with
AIDS epidemic). AIDS prevention education in South Africa is being incorpo-
rated into social responsibility programs of major corporations as a way of raising
awareness to transform AIDS into a preventable disease. See id. (discussing possi-
bility of corporate action in form of coalition of government, business and labor
leaders in education and prevention).
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developing countries will actually purchase and use them, especially when
other situations, such as poverty, impose larger, more immediate concerns
to the people of developing countries.
70
The "gray market" argument is based on two different markets emerg-
ing for pharmaceuticals, one in developed countries for selling patented
drugs at higher monopolistic prices, and one in developing countries for
selling the same drugs at extremely low prices. 71 One commentator ar-
gues that this two-market system will lead to re-export markets where peo-
ple will buy pharmaceuticals at discounted prices in developing countries
and then re-export them to developed countries for a profit. 72 As noted
by the International Intellectual Property Institution (IIPI), "[w]ere phar-
maceutical companies to establish significantly lower prices for developing
country markets, they would risk having products sold in those markets re-
imported into their profit-generating home markets-creating a 'gray
market' for their own products."7 3 These arguments all have valid con-
cerns. Nonetheless, allowing too narrow of an interpretation is not the
best solution because it does nothing to relieve the tension between devel-
oping and developed countries and is too one-sided.7 4 Consequently, de-
70. See Nash, supra note 5, at 498-99 (emphasizing Medicines Act and generic
substitution provisions allowing access to adequate AIDS therapy are not full solu-
tion to South Africa's AIDS crisis). Nash further states:
[G]iven South Africa's poor living conditions and poorly educated popu-
lation, a supply of antiretrovirals cannot be expected to address HIV in-
fection on its own. For example, South Africa is currently experiencing
1600 new cases a day of an almost entirely preventable infection. How
compliant this population will be in following a rigid and often complex
antiretroviral drug regimen is, at this point, only speculative.
Id.
71. See John Lee, Gilbert Tobin: Developments in Biotechnology Law: Settlement of
South African Litigation-A Bitter Pill for the Pharmaceutical Industy?, at http://
www.gtlaw.com.au (May 29, 2001) (emphasizing that emergence of two different
markets will cause patent owners to rely on laws of each country regarding cross-
border trade to prevent gray markets from developing).
72. See id. (noting drawback of compulsory licensing and generic substitution
under Medicines Act, causing pharmaceutical companies to asses patent protec-
tion position of each country in which they wish to invest). Australia and the Euro-
pean Union are examples: Australia uses border patrols to prevent cross-border
trade and parallel importations, while the European Union, by purpose of its goal
of free movement of goods across member borders, may not be able to prevent
development of gray markets. See id. (highlighting concern of developed countries
over substantially discounted prices in developing countries).
73. IIPI, supra note 64, at http://www.iipi.org/eng/projects/aids.asp. The
IIPI suggests that consumer groups in the United States favor the "gray market"
because they will be able to take advantage of the lower prices. See id. (discussing
side effect of price differentials between developed country and developing coun-
try markets).
74. See Abbot, supra note 8, at 72 (opining that United States use of unilateral
economic sanctions may lead developing countries to question fundamentals of
TRIPs). "Would any developing country government deliberately negotiate away
its discretion to take measures to redress a health crisis of the most severe magni-
tude? Indeed, would any government or any group of citizens deliberately enter
into a legal agreement condemning itself to early death?" Id.
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veloping countries may ignore the narrow interpretation just as they have
ignored past attempts at regulation of intellectual property rights.
75
B. Allowing a Broad Interpretation of TRPs
Developing countries acknowledge that effective patent protection is
a prerequisite for an innovative pharmaceutical industry; however, they
also believe in balancing all interests to provide protection against abuse
by the patent holder. 76 The benefits of limiting the patent right will ac-
crue to pharmaceutical consumers and Third World generic manufactur-
ers, with consumers paying lower prices.77 Proponents of limiting patent
rights and allowing compulsory licenses do not believe that research and
development (R&D) will be discouraged because those costs are recovered
from sales in industrialized countries, where most of the patients have
health insurance.
7 8
Developing countries also argue for allowing compulsory licensing
under TRIPs in light of the historical practice of Western pharmaceutical
companies exploiting therapeutic remedies developed and applied by
75. See Ford, supra note 5, at 970 (suggesting that interpreting TRIPs too nar-
rowly may lead to its denunciation by developing countries); Harrelson, supra note
45, at 201 (eluding to fact that pharmaceutical companies and United States may
seem uncompassionate to society if measures are not taken to address HIV/AIDS
crisis in developing countries); Weissman, supra note 7, at 1070 (suggesting that
pharmaceutical industry knows of alternatives to its restrictive reading of TRIPs
and is trying to suppress them); PHRMA, supra note 46, at 100 (describing ineffec-
tive enforcement of intellectual property protection under TRIPs by various coun-
tries including India, Argentina and Egypt). "The Government of India is aware of
its WTO TRIPs obligations, but has failed to meet them. Thus, India remains the
single worst WTO scofflaw." Id. PhRMA also notes that both Argentina and Egypt
violate their TRIPs obligations and that a number of other countries, including
Canada, do not provide the TRIPs twenty-year exclusivity term. See id. (addressing
inefficiency of intellectual property protection in many countries, even some devel-
oped countries).
76. See Duckett, supra note 1, at http://www.icaso.org/docs/compulsoryen-
glish.htm. (offering example of Indian drug industry whose companies are given
authority to produce drugs for local market without paying high licensing fees,
leading to lower cost to consumers and high return to Indian pharmaceutical
company).
77. SeeWeissman, supra note 7, at 1116 (advancing benefits of allowing broad
interpretation of compulsory licensing by limiting patent right).
78. See Duckett, supra note 1, at http://www.icaso.org/docs/compulsoryen-
glish.htm (advancing argument that Africa accounts for just over one percent of
global pharmaceutical market and thus is not threat to R&D funding). Professor
Richard Laing, of Boston University's School of Public Health, has argued:
[T]he global pharmaceutical market is so large (over $400 billion per
year) and the proportional contribution of Africa, Southeast Asia, and
the Commonwealth of Independent States to both turnover and profit so
small, that these markets could be completely isolated from the global
total and pharmaceutical manufacturers would not be affected in any
measurable way.
Id. For a comparison of who bears the cost of pharmaceutical R&D, pharmaceuti-
cal companies or the government, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47: p. 605
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traditional healers in developing countries. 79 Commentators refer to this
practice as biopiracy. 80 They contend that allowing too much protection
under TRIPs will shift control of traditional practices away from local com-
munities and to large, foreign corporations.8
1
While these arguments present valid concerns for developing coun-
tries, simply allowing a broad interpretation of TRIPs is as futile as al-
lowing a narrow one.8 2 Industrialized countries should not alone bear the
recovery of pharmaceutical development costs for the simple reason that
79. See Fidler, supra note 64, at 212-13 (noting that traditional medicine is
viewed by Western pharmaceutical companies as commodity whereby Western
companies take traditional cures, develop them and export them back into devel-
oping country at high cost). Fidler further states:
Typically, a Western pharmaceutical company finds a compound of thera-
peutic value in traditional medical practices, takes the compound back to
its headquarters, refines its chemistry, and patents the research and devel-
opment, giving it the opportunity to reap monopoly profits without re-
turning anything to the society from which the knowledge originally
came.
Id.
80. See The Right to Good Ideas: Patents and the Poor, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2001,
at Special (stating that developing countries apply different meaning to word
"piracy" than developed countries and suggesting moral objection of developing
countries to exclusive exploitation of living things). Developing countries would
like to see an end to "biopiracy," which demonstrates that poor countries are not
opposed to a proper patent regime; they just want one that fits their needs. See id.
(discussing Costa Rican laws exempting genes from patent and Brazil's desire for
TRIPs to include "biopiracy" provisions). Some countries "are introducing laws
that would require all those applying for intellectual-property rights over, say, a
plant variety, to declare where they got it and to prove that they not only have the
consent of its native users, but have arranged to share the eventual rewards of
commercialisation." Id. 1 ,
81. See Gutowski, supra note 23, at 748 (explaining differences in ownership
standards of developing and developed countries). Gutowski explains that natives
of developing countries believe natural resources are gifts from gods, with proper-
ties self-evident to all; thus, no one is the owner or inventor of processes utilizing
natural resources. See id. (noting native concept of ownership). Developed coun-
tries, on the other hand, believe in free reign over natural resources, which Gutow-
ski illustrates in his example of the neem tree in India. See id. (describing that
W.R. Grace, U.S. pharmaceutical company, patented process for extracting chemi-
cals from neem tree traditionally used by indigenous peoples for making
medicines, insecticides, contraceptives and soap); see also The Right to Good Ideas:
Patents and the Poor, supra note 80, at Special (advancing that developing countries
contain many natural resources, which could lead to new drugs and crops to bene-
fit poor but few of these people can afford $20,000 cost of obtaining patent or $1.5
million cost to challenge one). "Money is little object, however, to many western
entrepreneurs who venture to far-flung parts, bring home such riches [and natural
resources] and then proceed to patent them." Id.
82. See Ford, supra note 5, at 971 (suggesting that allowing overly broad inter-
pretation of compulsory licensing will cause developed countries to pursue options
outside TRIPs dispute settlement procedure to enforce their patent rights in devel-
oping countries); see also Pechman, supra note 7, at 199 (noting that current con-
cessions given by TRIPs to developing nations already provoke United States to
rely on unilateral actions outside scope of TRIPs such as Special 301).
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developing countries are poor.83 Sympathy for developing countries can
only go so far.8 4 Allowing too broad of an interpretation will heighten
tensions, possibly widening the gap between developed and developing
countries. 85 Also, at least one commentator eludes to the possibility that
compulsory licensing is probably not the most feasible solution for devel-
oping-countries because they lack proper infrastructure. 86
C. Leaving Interpretation of TRIPs to the DSB
Commentators suggest that disputing parties should utilize WTO's
DSB instead of continuing to rely on diplomatic measures to resolve their
disputes.8 7 While developed countries may have nothing to gain, develop-
ing countries could secure legitimacy in compulsory licensing schemes by
bringing a dispute to the DSB. 88 A practical method for the WTO to re-
solve the uncertainty surrounding compulsory licensing's applicability
would be to use the DSB to clarify the language of these provisions in
Article 31 of TRIPs. 89
83. See PHRMA, supra note 46, at 103 (noting that TRIPs limits exceptions for
compulsory licensing to cases of extreme urgency and that those conditions do not
prevail in any countries practicing compulsory licensing).
84. See id. (discussing TRIPs exceptions for compulsory licensing).
85. See Fidler, supra note 64, at 191 (claiming that globalization of markets,
laws and culture, including international regime of protecting patents, are increas-
ing gap between developed and developing countries).
86. See Harrelson, supra note 45, at 192 (opining that compulsory licensing
will lessen AIDS problem in countries with infrastructure and technology to manu-
facture HIV drugs but will not solve problem of affordability in least developed
countries-e.g., countries in sub-Saharan Africa that lack proper infrastructure
and technology). For arguments of developed countries on allowing a narrow
reading of TRIPs concerning compulsory licensing, see supra notes 59-75 and ac-
companying text.
87. See Ford, supra note 5, at 968-70 (emphasizing need for disputing parties
to utilize DSB and its underlying goals of negotiation); Rein, supra note 4, at 396-
98 (relaying example cases of pharmaceutical patent protection brought under
WTO dispute settlement procedures). In May 1999, the United States simultane-
ously requested consultations with Argentina and Canada alleging violations of
TRIPs. See id. at 397 (noting U.S. allegations that Argentina failed to implement
exclusive marketing provisions and Canada's grandfather provision violated twenty
year exclusivity period under TRIPs). In February 1999, the DSB established a
panel to review Canada's pharmaceutical patent system at the request of the Euro-
pean Union. See id. (describing Canada's pharmaceutical patent laws). The Euro-
pean Union alleged that Canada's patent legislation, allowing for stockpiling of
generic pharmaceuticals six months before patent expiration, violated the exclu-
sive rights provision of TRIPs (Article 28.1) and the panel agreed with the Euro-
pean Union. See id. at 397-98 (noting panel decision that stockpiling of generic
pharmaceuticals is not limited exception defined by Article 30 of TRIPs and vio-
lates Agreement).
88. See Ford, supra note 5, at 968-69 (advancing that developed countries are
more likely to use unilateral sanctions to avoid binding negative decisions by DSB,
but developing countries bringing and winning disputes on compulsory licensing
might pave way for other developing countries to enact similar legislation).
89. See id. at 970 (explaining that DSB either needs to clearly define language
of Article 31 or base its interpretation of compulsory licensing provision on DSB
[Vol. 47: p. 605
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This appears to be a viable approach.9 0 Nevertheless, the power of
developed countries has already been demonstrated and exerted against
developing countries.9 1 Because developed countries have nothing to
gain by bringing a dispute in front of the DSB, mandating they do so most
likely will meet strong opposition and the use of unilateral action against
the TRIPs-violating developing country.9 2 Developing countries would
then be forced to accept the terms set forth by the powerful developed
countries or risk harm to their relationship in the international trade
market.9 3
D. Direct Price Control
Some scholars suggest that developing countries should employ direct
price control systems, like those used in Europe, which could result in
cheaper drug prices.9 4 These systems vary in structure, but most entail
negotiations between manufacturers and governmental agencies to deter-
mine a proper price.95 The negotiating parties consider both the consum-
ers' ability to pay and the manufacturers' expected profits.9 6 Some
definition of "inadequate usage" concept from Paris Convention adopted by
TRIPs).
90. See id. at 972 (opining that to balance interests of developed and develop-
ing countries, "the WTO should permit 'compulsory licenses for cases of 'inade-
quate usage' of all pharmaceutical patents for drugs used to treat life-threatening
diseases, which affect a significant portion of a nation's citizens and are not availa-
ble to those affected through the current market practices."). But see id. (noting
that questions will arise as to meaning of life-threatening disease, with burden on
developing country to prove that goal of its licensing scheme is to alleviate life-
threatening disease).
91. See Pechman, supra note 7, at 197-98 (describing U.S. Special 301 action
against Brazil in response to pharmaceutical industry complaints that Brazil en-
couraged piracy). Pechman notes that the United States retaliated by imposing
100% tariffs on Brazilian exports, including items having no relation to
pharmaceuticals such as paper products and electronics. See id. at 198, 204 (em-
phasizing that Special 301 allowed United States to retaliate in sectors not under
dispute while, if brought before DSB, the United States would only be allowed
same sector pharmaceutical retaliation).
92. See Ford supra note 5, at 968-69 (discussing how developed countries have
greater incentive to rely on unilateral action). For a further discussion of the U.S.
argument that TRIPs already concedes too much to developing countries, see
supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
93. For a further discussion of U.S. bullying tactics, see supra note 7 and ac-
companying text.
94. See Griffin, supra note 4, at 405-10 (providing Australia, New Zealand, Ja-
pan and most European countries as examples where direct price controls are em-
ployed and offering proposal for direct price control system in United States to
alleviate expense of AIDS drugs).
95. See id. at 406 (noting that prices in controlled markets generally decreased
relative to consumer price index in 1980s).
96. See id. at 406-07 (relaying study in Europe which surveyed drug prices and
concluded that prices for selected products in United States were eighty-six per-
cent more than those in countries with strict price control systems in place).
23
Nerozzi: The Battle over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Count
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
commentators believe that direct price controls could force the drug in-
dustry to streamline R&D.
9 7
Direct price controls might work in European countries, which al-
ready have sophisticated pharmaceutical infrastructure and national
health care systems.98 In developing countries, however, direct price con-
trols might not work because of the lack of adequate infrastructure and
health care programs.9 9 Lack, of money to construct a better medical in-
frastructure will require wealthy countries to implement international sub-
sidization in order to provide necessary funds. 10 0 Another criticism of
direct price control is that it leads to a lack of innovation and lower quality
drugs. 10 ' Developing countries employing a direct price control system
also might appear unfavorable to Western pharmaceutical companies be-
cause direct price control is not based on a free-market system. 10 2 Still,
there is the noteworthy example of India, a less developed country whose
pharmaceutical market is flourishing under the direct control system.
10 3
India, however, did not become a member of the WTO until recently and
might have to change its laws to comply with TRIPs. 10 4
97. See id. at 406 (arguing that direct price controls might allow focus to shift
to "truly innovative products rather than 'me-too' products currently flooding the
market."). But see id. (noting opposition of pharmaceutical companies to direct
price control on grounds that it would impede innovation).
98. See id. at 407 (offering that national health care systems employed by Eu-
ropean countries result in lower out-of-pocket drug costs, but in countries that do
not use national health care systems, including United States, prescription drugs
may be one of consumers' highest out-of-pocket expenses).
99. See id. (listing only developed countries in examples of direct price con-
trol systems that work). For a discussion on the lack of adequate infrastructure in
developing countries, see supra notes 68-70, 86 and accompanying text.
100. See IIPI, supra note 64, at http://www.iipi.org/eng/projects/aids.asp
(proposing policy to resolve AIDS crisis utilizing national exhaustion principles
coupled with price controls and international subsidization of pharmaceutical
purchases).
101. See Griffin, supra note 4, at 407 (advancing that industry can draw conclu-
sion, although speculative, that price controls are reason for decreased innovation
in Europe and duplicative innovation in Japan).
102. See McCabe, supra note 53, at 60 (stating that restrictive price controls-
i.e., not allowing adequate return on investment-will restrain importation of pat-
ented pharmaceuticals into developing countries).
103. See Matthew Kramer, Comment, The Bolar Amendment Abroad: Preserving
the Integrity of American Patents Overseas After the South African Medicines Act, 18 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 553, 569 (2000) (describing Indian model under Drug Price Control
Order that placed price controls on drugs and production). "By the mid-1990s,
the Indian pharmaceutical industry had become a net exporter of drugs, focusing
on lower margin markets such as the former Soviet states, developing nations and
... South Africa." Id. But see MartinJ. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits
of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 507, 527 (1996) (noting that Indian drug companies have grown and
become competitive, but have failed to innovate due to lack of pharmaceutical
patent protection).
104. See Kramer, supra note 103, at 569 (suggesting that Indian pharmaceuti-
cal industry flourished only because it did not have to comply with international
patent protection agreements); PHRMA, supra note 46, at 99-100 (noting that In-
[Vol. 47: p. 605
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E. Pooled Procurement
Under a pooled procurement scheme, countries with small national
populations join together to purchase drugs and sell them on a common
market, which ultimately leads to cheaper prices.1 0 5 The combined opera-
tion allows the countries involved to develop a single multi-country unit,
thereby leading to better drug evaluation.' 0 6 The scheme is also utilized
by large organizations. 10 7 Doctors Without Borders, a non-governmental
organization (NGO), has noted that global procurement guarantees high
demand, reliable payment and straightforward negotiation of lower
prices.10 8 Under this type of system, which relies on bulk purchasing,
there is a fear of lower quality drugs, but commentators agree that the
United Nations (UN) can pre-qualify producers participating in the system
to ensure drug quality.10 9 Pooled procurement has worked for small
countries, such as those in the Carribbean. 10 The main crisis however, is
occurring in Africa, which is a considerable portion of the world's popula-
tion and where procurement might not be feasible." 1 Another drawback
of the procurement system, as noted above, is the tendency for drugs pur-
chased by bulk to be lower in quality. 1 2 Pooled procurement also tends
to discourage local production and manufacturing, which might have neg-
dia is now one of worst markets for U.S. pharmaceuticals because it fails to meet its
TRIPs obligations of pharmaceutical patent protection).
105. See Duckett, supra note 1, at http://www.icaso.org/docs/compulsoryen-
glish.htm (explaining that this option worked in Caribbean since 1980s, where
seven different countries joined together to purchase and resell pharmaceuticals).
106. See id. (noting power of pooled procurement in allowing development of
expertise in drug evaluation and price negotiation).
107. See id. (demonstrating that some large U.S. health maintenance organi-
zations buy drugs in large amounts, thus lowering their prices).
108. See Ellen 't Hoen & Suerie Moon, Doctors Without Borders, Campaign for
Access to Essential Medicines: Pills and Pocketbooks: Equity Pricing of Essential Medicines in
Developing Countries (July 11, 2001), at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publi-
cations.asp?scntid=318200146197&contenttypePARA& (last visted Dec. 19, 2001)
(advancing global procurement as possible solution for access to essential
medicines, specifically AIDS medicines).
109. See id. (noting experience and expertise of United Nations Children's
Fund with bulk procurement).
110. See Duckett, supra note 1, at http://www.icaso.org/docs/compulsoryen-
glish.htm (noting Caribbean success in pooled procurement has resulted in fifty
percent reduction of pharmaceutical prices).
111. See id. (suggesting pooled procurement as option for countries with
small national populations but supplying no information regarding countries with
large national populations).
112. See Hoen 't & Moon, supra note 108, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/
prod/publications.asp?scntid=318200146197&contenttype=PARA& (highlighting
method of quality control United Nations can implement).
2002] NOTE
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ative impacts on a country's economy. 1 13 Finally, pooled procurement
fails to overcome the patent barrier to use and transport." 4
F. Planned Donations
The World Health Organization (WHO) is now encouraging planned
donation programs for drugs, whereby developed nations donate stocks of
drugs currently in use for treatment of an array of diseases.' 15 Many U.S.
pharmaceutical companies implemented donation programs after drop-
ping their lawsuit against South Africa, including Merck, GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK), Pfizer and Bristol-Myers Squibb. 116 For example, Bristol-Myers
Squibb recently announced a program to fight H1V/AIDS in Africa, sell-
ing antiretroviral drugs at over ninety-percent below cost. 117 Similarly, in
August, Merck announced its collaboration with the government of Bot-
swana, whereby Merck would give free antiretroviral drugs to Botswana for
five years and one hundred million dollars for training, education and
condoms.118
113. See id. (encouraging development of local generic production as part of
pooled procurement strategy).
114. See id. ("For example, the lowest priced antiretroviral drugs are currently
produced generically in India, but today they cannot be used in countries where
these products are under patent.").
115. See Duckett, supra note 1, at http://www.icaso.org/docs/compulsoryen-
glish.htm (encouraging donations of drugs still in use and not just about-to-expire
stocks of drugs).
116. See GlaxoSmithKline Reaffirms Commitment to Fight Diseases of the Developing
World, at http://corp.gsk.com/press-archive/press-06112001.htm (June 11, 2001)
(emphasizing that "GSK [GlaxoSmithKline] is the only company currently in-
volved in research and development for both prevention and treatment of all three
top priority diseases of the World Health Organization: malaria, tuberculosis and
HIV/AIDS"). GSK also emphasizes its commitments to expand the number of
countries and consumer groups eligible for preferential pricing, and to offer its
antiretroviral AIDS cocktail at a ninety percent discount from the world average
price and offer new antiretrovirals at preferential prices to developing countries.
See id. (noting GSK's commitment to fighting diseases of developing countries).
117. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Bristol-Myers Squibb Announces Acceler-
ated Program to Fight HIV/AIDS in Africa, at http://www.bms.com/news/press/data/
fg.press-release_1446.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (highlighting four-point
program: (1) offering AIDS drugs below cost; (2) maintaining transparent pricing
for AIDS drugs in Africa; (3) providing $115 million in SECURE THE FUTURE®
Philanthropy; and (4) and emergency patent relief).
118. See A New Approach, ECONOMIsT, Aug. 11, 2001, at International (outlin-
ing proposed program for free antiretroviral drugs by Merck and medical founda-
tion started by Bill Gates). But see id. (discussing how Botswana is "rich" when
compared to other African countries). Botswana is ideal for the program because
it has a small population and growing economy, and even without the donation,
the dollar a day it currently costs each Botswana AIDS patient for triple therapy
drugs is manageable. See id. ("Most of sub-Saharan Africa lacks Botswana's wealth,
health system, foreign assistance and political leadership .... South Africa next
door has at least ... [four million infected] .... The cost and logistics of handing
out pills there are daunting.").
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Planned drug donations are helpful and seem to be a viable solution
at first glance.' 19 What pharmaceutical press releases are not reporting,
however, is that many of these donations come with imposed conditions or
other strings.120 Recently, Doctors Without Borders and other NGOs have
criticized planned donation programs for attaching conditions, limiting
the scope of donations and taking too much time to implement donation
programs. 12 1 Most NGOs now believe that donations may be helpful but
are only a short-term unsustainable solution.
122
119. For a discussion of various donation programs instituted by pharmaceuti-
cal companies to give poor people in developing countries greater access to essen-
tial AIDS medicines, see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. For an outline
of Pfizer's donation programs, see supra note 9. But see Doctors Without Borders,
Pfizer Limits Scope of Donation of HIV Drug in South Africa. MSF Reiterates Demand That
Pfizer Unconditionally Reduce Price or Issue Voluntary License for Fluconazole, at http://
www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=2282001 256162&content
type& (June 20, 2000) (noting that Pfizer has not fulfilled promise to provide
Fluconazole (Diflucan) for free to people with HIV/AIDS in South Africa and that
Pfizer has imposed conditions on donation).
120. See id. ("Most outrageous is Pfizer's attempt to structure this donation
like a clinical trial, adding onerous reporting and training requirements. South
African physicians are experienced'professionals and it is patronizing to require
special training for routine treatments."). Another condition imposed by Pfizer is
placing a time limit on the offer. See id. (discussing disappointment of NGOs with
Pfizer's donation program and strings attached). The time limit on the offer di-
rectly contradicts Pfizer's press release concerning the Diflucan Partnership, which
states, "Pfizer's support has no dollar or time limits." Pfizer, Pfizer to Offer Diflucan
Antifungal Medicine At No Charge to HIV/AIDS Patients in 50 Least Developed Countries
Around the World, at http://www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/about/press/nochargediflu-
can.html (June 6, 2001).
121. See Doctors Without Borders, World AIDS Day Teleconference Transcript No-
vember 28, 2000, at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/wad2000_tran-
script.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (discussing current drug donation
programs). Mark Heywood, a representative of the Treatment Action Campaign, a
NGO that serves as a grassroots AIDS activist organization in South Africa, stated:
We are prepared to welcome this offer, this donation, but what we regret
is that it has taken nine months for this donation to become any kind of
reality. . . . It is not going to be immediately available to people who
suffer from [opportunistic infections related to AIDS]. The second thing
is that Pfizer is still limiting the offer to the public health sector. And yet
in South Africa many poor people with HIV and AIDS use the private
health sector .... We therefore are critical of the offer and do not accept
it in the terms with which it is being made available.
Id. Again, these conditions seem in direct conflict with Pfizer's press release con-
cerning the Diflucan donation program. See Pfizer, supra note 120, at http://
www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/about/press/nochargediflucan.html ("The company
will work closely with governments, non-governmental organizations, the UN and
the WHO to ensure Diflucan reaches all eligible patients who cannot afford treat-
ment.") (emphasis added).
122. See Doctors Without Borders, The Campaign: Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/campaign/faq.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (ad-
vancing opposition to drug donation programs as long term cure).
[Doctors Without Borders] does not believe that drug donations are a
long-term solution to the access crisis .... Drug donation programs can
also have other drawbacks, including: donations usually do not cover
global need and are limited in time and place; they often come with bur-
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V. A BETTER SOLUTION TO PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In light of the current AIDS crisis faced by many developing coun-
tries, programs should be implemented that will lead to long-term solu-
tions to the problem of essential pharmaceutical access, rather than short-
term gratification.1 23 This Note proposes reforming TRIPs to conform to
the realities of the twenty-first century. 124 The suggested reforms include:
(1) modifying TRIPs to exclude patentability of AIDS drugs under Article
27.or (2) developing a standard inquiry to determine what constitutes a
"national emergency" or "life-threatening" disease. 125 In addition, this
Note offers a test program to be implemented in one developing country
that would concentrate money and manpower on HIV/AIDS education
and prevention programs, as well as access to essential pharmaceuticals. 126
The goal of the program would be to establish a long-term feasible solu-
tion to AIDS and other national crises that may arise in the future. 12 7
A. Modifying TRIPs to Address the Present Situation
When TRIPs was created as a product of the Uruguay Round in 1994,
the global atmosphere was not the same as it is today.128 Developed coun-
tries pushing for patent protection were most concerned with protecting
densome restrictions on recipient health ministries; they often require
extra administrative work, diverting scarce resources from health systems;
they can distort rational drug use; tax deductions given for donations may
cost donor countries more than other options. Considering the weak-
nesses, donations should neither be relied-upon, portrayed, nor pro-
moted as the best way to improve access to medicines.
Id.
123. See Alain Guilloux & Suerie Moon, Hidden Price Tags: Disease-Specific Drug
Donations: Costs and Alternatives, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publica-
tions.asp?scntid=492001217138&contenttype& (Oct. 1, 2000) ("National Govern-
ments, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations including WHO, the World
Bank, UNICEF and [United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS], should promote so-
lutions that are more sustainable ... for the access crisis, such as encouraging
generic production and negotiating dramatically-reduced differential pricing for
branded products.").
124. For a discussion of the current HIV/AIDS crisis occurring in developing
countries, specifically South Africa, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
125. For a discussion of proposed modifications to Article 27 and advancing
the need to develop a standard inquiry as to what constitutes "national emergency"
in terms of Article 31, see infra notes 128-51 and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of the need for a long-term solution to national crises
and setting forth a test program. to develop a permanent solution to the current
AIDS crisis in developing countries, see infra notes 152-80 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of long-term goals of the test program, see infra notes
152-76 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion on the current AIDS crisis in developing countries, see
supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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their increasingly technological markets. 129 In contrast, developing coun-
tries today have the pressing issues of poverty, inadequate infrastructure
and medical crises, including AIDS. 130 As a result, TRIPs does not ade-
quately address the current AIDS pandemic faced by developing coun-
tries.13 1 For example, the U.S. Census Bureau recently compiled data
gathered on HIV seroprevalence for pregnant women in South Africa
from 1991 to 1999 to map the epidemic state. 132 The data illustrate an
increase in HIV infection from about seven percent in 1994 to twenty-two
percent in 1999.133 In light of this current situation faced by developing
countries TRIPS should be modified; or at least reviewed carefully, at the
next meeting of the WTO to better explain remedial measures for health
crises. 1
3 4
The modifications should leave in place standard protection of intel-
lectual property rights, but should also clearly address when exceptions,
such as compulsory licenses, can and must be used to alleviate hardships
faced by developing countries. 135 As one commentator noted, "[I]t is easy
to understand why developed countries . . . would advocate an interna-
tional intellectual property system. It is less clear why developing coun-
tries finally agreed to the TRIPs Agreement. Conventional wisdom is that
such nations joined TRIPs in exchange for other trading advantages from
developed countries .... ,"136 Thus, if developing countries gave up cer-
tain rights of pharmaceutical exploitation in the process, developed coun-
129. For a discussion of developed countries' view of intellectual property in
light of globalization and growth in technology-based markets, see supra notes 48-
50 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion offering a view on developing countries concerning in-
terpretation of TRIPs in light of the AIDS crisis, see supra notes 51-54 and accom-
panying text.
131. See International Programs Center, Population Division, United States
Census Bureau, HIV/AIDS Profile: South Africa: H1V/AIDS Surveillance Data Base, at
http://www.census.gov/ipc/hiv/safrica.pdf (June 2000) (offering demographic
indicators for AIDS profile of South Africa). The estimated percentage of adults
living with HIV/AIDS at the end of 1999 was 19.9%, with a 15-year difference in
life expectancy between those with AIDS and those without AIDS, and the cumula-
tive AIDS rate as of 1996 was 0.30 per thousand. See id. (noting that life expectancy
of those without AIDS is sixty-six years, while it is only fifty-one years for those with
AIDS).
132. See id. (presenting epidemiological data on AIDS crisis in South Africa).
133. See id. (noting that AIDS epidemic began later in South Africa than in
other African countries). "By the mid 1990's, infection rates among pregnant wo-
men were increasing tremendously. South Africa is now facing one of the most
serious HIV epidemics in the world." Id.
134. See Ford, supra note 5, at 969-70 (recommending that most practical
method WTO could implement to resolve dispute over compulsory licensing is to
review and clarify language in Article 31 of TRIPs).
135. See Marschall, supra note 39, at 1188-89 (arguing that compulsory licens-
ing should be used only when appropriate and current TRIPs Agreement does not
clearly identify scope of exceptions under Articles 8, 30 and 31, which could all
justify compulsory licensing).
136. Id. at 1187.
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tries should recognize this and give them some leeway in determining the
proper use of provisions such as compulsory licensing. 137
This is not the first time amendment or modification of TRIPs has
been suggested.138 The solution suggested here, however, is to modify
Article 27, concerning patentable subject matter and the possibility of
compulsory licensing.' l 9 According to one commentator, "Article 71 of
the TRIPS Agreement authorizes the TRIPS Council, established in Article
68, 'to undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new developments
which might warrant modifications or amendment of this [TRIPS] Agree-
ment. "140 The TRIPs Council can utilize this power to modify TRIPs to
conform to the AIDS crisis in developing countries.' 4' For example, Arti-
cle 27(3) (a) provides that "members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals[.]'1 42 Developing countries could make the argument
to the TRIPs Council that essential AIDS drugs constitute a therapeutic
method for the treatment of humans and should be excluded from patent-
ability.143 Developing countries and NGOs would then unite and lobby
the TRIPs Council for the modification. 144 Developing countries have a
good chance for success and acceptance of their interpretation, given the
international public opinion regarding developed country pharmaceutical
137. See id. at 1189 (noting that provisions of TRIPs justifying compulsory li-
censes may be reason why developing countries signed on to TRIPs). Nevertheless,
some commentators feel that TRIPs conceded too much to developing countries.
For a further discussion offering the developed countries' argument as to why
TRIPs should be interpreted narrowly to make it more difficult for developing
countries to issue compulsory licenses, see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying
text. The concessions argument touches on sovereignty, which is outside the scope
of this Note.
138. See McCabe, supra note 53, at 63 (explaining that it appears TRIPs may
be modified without consent of Full Ministerial Conference of WTO, while amend-
ment must be reviewed by Ministerial Conference); Marschall, supra note 39, at
1190 ("This Note proposes an amendment to the TRIPS agreement that would
curtail the use of the broadly worded escape clause currently available to develop-
ing nations.").
139. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 601 (setting forth patentable subject matter
under TRIPs).
140. McCabe, supra note 53, at 63; see TRIPs, supra note 6, at 618 (referring to
review and amendment of TRIPs by Council for TRIPs).
141. Cf McCabe, supra note 53, at 63-64 (advancing modification of TRIPs
Article 27(3) based on provision excluding plants and animals from patentability).
142. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 601 (discussing patentable subject matter).
143. Cf McCabe, supra note 53, at 64 (noting that United States should lobby
for TRIPs modification of Article 27(3)).
144. See Guilloux & Moon, supra note 123, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/
prod/publications.asp?scntid=492001217138&contenttype=PARA& (recom-
mending unity of national governments, NGOs and intergovernmental organiza-
tions in promoting sustainable solutions for access to essential AIDS medicines).
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companies and the realization by organizations, including the WHO, that
something must be done to remedy the AIDS crisis. 14 5
B. Developing Standard Inquiry Under TRIPs As to Wat Constitutes a
National Emergency
In the instance that developing countries fail to persuade the TRIPs
Council to accept their interpretation of Article 27, developing countries
can lobby for clarification as to what constitutes a "national emergency"
under Article 31 of TRIPs.' 46 This Note does not suggest that devel6ping
countries ask for a bright line rule or definition of "national emer-
gency."1 47 Instead, a better option would be to develop a standard inquiry
under which a panel, including DSB representatives, developing country
representatives and developed country representatives, would decide if the
crisis was extreme enough to be considered a "national emergency" and
outweighed developed country interests in patent protection.148 Factors
to be considered in determining a "national emergency" should include:
(1) the nature of the disease: for example does it kill orjust maim; (2) if
the disease results in death, are there significant differences in morbidity
rate in lower socioeconomic groups as compared to upper socioeconomic
groups; (3) the expected decimation in total population attributable to
the disease; (4) the estimated drop in life expectancy due to the disease;
(5) the amount of people in the country affected by the disease, both di-
rectly and indirectly; (6) the impact of the disease on the country's econ-
omy; (7) the number of people who can currently afford treatment; (8)
the estimated number of people who will receive treatment if the excep-
tion is allowed; and (9) the adequacy of treatment facilities or, in other
words, the feasibility of compulsory licensing given the infrastructure of
the country.1 49 This inquiry would be a start, with other necessary factors
added over time.
145. See Toby Kasper, South Africa's Victory for the Developing World, at http://
www. accessmed-msf. org/prod / publications. asp?scntid= 3182001040389&content
type& (July 1, 2001) (explaining special session of Council for TRIPs, wherein de-
veloping countries mandated TRIPs be interpreted to allow developing countries
to place health protection above patent protection). For a discussion of planned
donation programs encouraged by the WHO to alleviate medical crises in develop-
ing countries, see supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
146. See Ford, supra note 5, at 969-70 (recommending that DSB should clarify
language of TRIPs by basing interpretation of Article 31 on strong definition of
"inadequate usage" language of Paris Convention).
147. But see id. at 972 (offering definition of "inadequate usage" and opining
that offered definition would in turn define concept of "national emergency" and
place burden on license-seeking nation to prove existence of life-threatening
disease).
148. Cf Griffin, supra note 4, at 408-10 (providing proposal for direct price
control of AIDS drugs in United States, utilizing AIDS control board to determine
price of drug based on fifteen different factors).
149. Cf id. at 409 (listing fifteen different factors for determining price of
drug under direct price control system).
2002] NOTE
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Utilizing this inquiry, the panel would decide if the crisis in the devel-
oping country would warrant the term "national emergency," allowing the
country to undercut patent protection rules to alleviate the medical crisis.
Under this inquiry, the current AIDS pandemic clearly outweighs devel-
oped country interests in patent protection.150 Thus, AIDS constitutes a
"national emergency" under Article 31 of TRIPs, qualifying essential AIDS
pharmaceuticals for compulsory licensing or "other use . . . without the
authorization of the right holder.' 5 1
C. Test Program Proposal
In addition to modification and clarification of TRIPs, a test program
should be implemented to develop long-term economical practices and
solutions to national emergencies that may arise in both developed and
developing countries.' 5 2 This program would be implemented in one de-
veloping country and test a combination of proposed solutions to deter-
mine the best solution to combat AIDS and eventually other national
crises.153 Cooperation of governments, international financial institutions
(for example, the World Bank), non-governmental organizations (such as
150. See Doctors Without Borders, World AIDS Day 2000 Fact Sheet, at http://
www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/wad2000.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001)
(listing facts about AIDS). The facts listed include: HIV-positive people are fired
from their jobs, AIDS can cripple economic development of many countries by
striking people in their most productive years (twenty to forty year olds), AIDS has
orphaned thirteen million children, "high numbers of AIDS patients strain already
overburdened health care systems" and AIDS can be treated with antiretroviral
drugs but ninety-five percent of those infected cannot afford them. See id.
(describing impact of AIDS on many developing countries); see also A New Ap-
proach, supra note 118, at Intemational (discussing AIDS crisis in Botswana).
Botswana has the highest rate of HIV infection in the world: 350,000 of its
1.7 [million] people have the virus that causes AIDS. Over a third of its
young adult population, the most productive and the most sexually ac-
tive, are worst hit. Well over half of those aged between 25 and 29 years
have the disease. Every hour, says the government, a baby is infected.
The overall rate is not slowing. Average life expectancy has fallen from
60 years to 40 and may drop to below 30 by 2010. Botswana's economy,
an African success story, may stop growing at its current rate of about
5.5% a year and expand instead at under 2.5%, says the [International
Monetary Fund].
Id.
151. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 602.
152. See Doctors Without Borders, supra note 122, at http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/campaign/faq.shtm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (noting that campaign has
been working internationally to find long-term solution to lack of pharmaceutical
access).
153. See Hoen 't & Moon, supra note 108, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/
prod/publications.asp?scntid=318200146197&contenttype=PARA& (setting forth
that there will be no single measure to achieve access; only mix of "mutually sup-
portive strategies" will have impact).
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ACT UP) and test country citizens would be essential in order to supply
the proper funds, manpower and materials to the program. 1
54
As part of the program, pharmaceutical companies in developed
countries would donate a certain stock of essential drugs to the test coun-
try or agree to sell them at a lower price in exchange for a small royalty
payment. 155 This plan would utilize the DSB and TRIPs Council, as the
agreements should be drafted and policed by these bodies. 156 The DSB
and TRIPs Council would decide, under the standards and agreed-to ex-
ceptions of TRIPs, the proper terms and scope of these agreements, the
means of implementation, the proper royalty payments and the expiration
period. 15
7
The agreements also would include projects for building an adequate
medical infrastructure and educating the people of the country.' 5 8 The
education programs need to reach the rural masses and should be taught
by Africans, as the masses may be more apt to listen to them than foreign-
ers given the history of imperialism. 159 The communal and sharing cul-
ture of South Africa, which would lead many citizens to favor generic
substitution over patent protection, may be an obstacle to success. 160 Nev-
ertheless, under the test program, a more traditional African approach,
including community involvement, should be favored, as Western-style ap-
proaches to Africa's problems have failed miserably in the past.16 1 The
developed countries of the West will play a larger role in the drug dona-
tion, monetary investment and medical training of Africans, with South
154. For further discussion of cooperative efforts, see supra note 144 and ac-
companying text.
155. For a discussion of current donation programs, see supra notes 115-18
and accompanying text.
156. See World Trade Organization, supra note 35, at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/thewto e/whatis e/tif-e/displ-e.htm (noting that WTO's "most individual
contribution" is providing means of settling disputes to make trading system more
secure and predictable). The DSB and TRIPs Council are the proper bodies to
implement this program because they were developed specifically to handle dis-
putes arising under TRPs and to review TRIPs. See id. (discussing contribution of
dispute settlement procedures). For a further discussion of the formation of the
DSB and TRIPs Council, see supra notes 31-32, 140 and accompanying text.
157. For a further discussion of the DSB and TRIPs Council, see supra note
156 and accompanying text.
158. Cf Pfizer, African and Western Alliance to Build First Large-Scale AIDS Medi-
cal Training Facility in Africa, at http://www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/about/press/aid-
sfacility.html (June 11, 2001) (describing plans for HIV/AIDS clinic in Uganda to
train medical personnel from all over continent on latest treatment options).
159. See generally Gutowski, supra note 23, at 744-45 (discussing developing
country fears of Western economic and moral imperialism).
160. For a discussion of the African cultural sense of community, see supra
note 52 and accompanying text.
161. See Fidler, supra note 64, at 205-06 (explaining that Western neo-liberal
structural adjustment programs implemented in late 1980s undercut public health
and health care systems in developing countries).
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African communities taking the forefront in distribution and education
once the proper medical infrastructure is in place.
162
The proposed plan would create a balance between developing coun-
tries and developed countries, as the developed nations would receive a
royalty payment, which they could utilize in R&D. 163 In exchange for the
royalty, developing countries would receive a one-time donation of drugs,
accompanied by larger quantities of drugs sold at lower prices. 164 The
incentives would be high for both developed, and developing countries, as
economic development would follow the increased investments in ade-
quate infrastructure. 165 Thus, the South African economy would grow
and intellectual property rights would receive proper protection, resulting
in South Africa becoming more attractive to international investors. 166 As
a result of economic growth, South Africans would have more money to
purchase pharmaceuticals and prices could then be raised, generating
more money for pharmaceutical companies.
16 7
The temptation to sell the drugs on the "gray market" could be ad-
vanced as a possible drawback to this proposal. 168 Nevertheless, the DSB
would serve as the policing agent and have the power to implement harsh
penalties toward the test country if the stocks of drugs reached the "gray
market. 1 69 For example, as a sanction for disobedience, the DSB could
end the program and enforce strict compliance with TRIPs, thereby ban-
ning the use of exceptions. 170 By applying harsh sanctions for non-com-
pliance, the government then would be required to offer adequate
policing mechanisms of its own to ensure that the stock of drugs is in the
162. Cf IIPI, supra note 64, at http://www.iipi.org/eng/projects/aids.asp
(stating that, "any comprehensive effort to supply state-of-the-art pharmaceuticals
to these [developing] countries will require a significant international subsidiza-
tion by wealthy states and manufacturers"). "The World Bank has a history of or-
ganizing such programs . . . [and] could put together a coordinated plan,
involving international aid programs from developed countries and private sector
humanitarian organizations, to supply the necessary funding." Id.
163. For a discussion on royalty payments, see supra note 155 and accompany-
ing text.
164. For a discussion of already existing drug donation programs, see gener-
ally supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion on inadequate infrastructure in developing.countries,
see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
166. See PHRMA, supra note 46, at 105 ("Progress in intellectual property pro-
tection has occurred because countries all over the world have recognized that
such protection encourages investment, innovation, and economic growth.").
167. See id. (noting that stronger intellectual property rights help developing
countries by "improving the conditions for investment, encouraging the develop-
ment of local industry, and enabling more goods to be produced").
168. For a discussion on the "gray market," see supra notes 71-73 and accom-
panying text.
169. For a further discussion on the functions of the DSB, see supra note 156
and accompanying text.
170. See generally World Trade Organization, supra note 35, at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif e/displ-e.htm (discussing dispute
settlement under DSB).
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proper hands.1 71 This policing approach would negate the gray market-
ing of drugs. The DSB would also monitor the progress of the test country
and compile data on program performance. 172 If the test program shows
promise, other countries could begin to institute the same type of
program. 173
This solution seems viable as it would allow developing countries to
alleviate part of their AIDS crises, would give developed countries incen-
tive to research and develop new drugs to aid in international health crises
and would create a favorable trading atmosphere.1 7 4 Thus, the test propo-
sal would negate the tension that currently exists between developed and
developing countries.1 7 5 The program would require large amounts of
time, money and manpower investment but, if proven successful, would
offer a permanent solution filling part of the economic and health gap
between developed and developing countries in a world where globaliza-
tion is the norm. 176 The time and manpower required would only be a
temporary burden on developed countries because citizens of the test
country will be used to implement the program. 177 Time and manpower
from the United States, for example, would be minimal and used for train-
ing African citizens in proper distribution, prevention and education prac-
tices.1 78 The trained Africans can in turn train and inform other African
citizens, resulting in a domino effect. 179 On the other hand, monetary
effort would come mainly from international financial institutions and de-
171. Cf Lee, supra note 71, at http://www.gtlaw.com.au/t/publications/de-
fault.jsp?pubid=264 (noting Australian government prevention of cross-border
trading of patented product through use of border controls).
172. Cf World Trade Organization, supra note 35, at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoqe/whatis-e/tif e/displ-e.htm (discussing DSB monitoring and
dispute settlement procedures).
173. See generally id. (discussing power of DSB panel decisions).
174. For further discussion of solutions for developing countries, see supra
notes 123-73 and accompanying text, and infra notes 175-80 and accompanying
text.
175. For further discussion of how this proposal would negate tensions be-
tween developed and developing countries, with respect to TRIPs, see supra notes
152-74 and accompanying text, and infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
176. See Fidler, supra note 64, at 191 (discussing belief of many critics that
current globalization processes are increasing health and economic gaps between
developed and developing countries).
177. For discussion of long-term solutions, see supra notes 152-76 and accom-
panying text, and infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
178. For discussion of long-term solutions, see supra notes 152-76 and accom-
panying text, and infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
179. Cf Pfizer, supra note 9, at http://www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/about/
press/aidsfacility.html (discussing establishment of AIDS clinic in Uganda).
[T]he [AIDS] clinic [in Uganda] "will have an influence far beyond the
doctors trained in it and the patients whom it treats. It is a reverse pyra-
mid: each doctor can train dozens of other doctors, and each doctor can
treat 200-300 AIDS patients at any one time. And other clinics, using the
center's guidelines, can be established across Africa."
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veloped countries that can afford to donate, allowing the test country to
devote more funds toward alleviating pressing domestic matters. 180
VI. CONCLUSION
Living in the twenty-first century, we have at our fingertips technology
that was only dreamed of not long ago. In the biotechnological field,
Western pharmaceutical companies have made significant advances. 18 1
These advances created the powerful AIDS cocktail, which has reduced
AIDS-related mortality by seventy-five percent in the United States. 18 2
These statistics show that AIDS is no longer considered an epidemic by the
Western world. 183 How is it then, with all of these advances, that AIDS is a
threat to the very existence of whole countries in the developing world?18 4
No one argues against protecting technology and intellectual property to
encourage investment and innovation.18 5 Nevertheless, protection must
yield when part of the world is faced with an epidemic likened to the Euro-
pean plague.' 8 6 The TRIPs Agreement was created not only to allow pro-
tection of intellectual property rights, but also to allow developing
countries flexibility in implementing those rights, especially in times of
national emergency. 187 While the framers of TRIPs may have believed it
was a well-defined agreement, providing clear requirements and excep-
tions, the current tensions between developed and developing countries
indicate that the framers were incorrect. 188
180. Cf Nash, supra note 5, at 498 (noting "South Africa's poor living condi-
tions and poorly educated population"); IIPI, supra note 64, at http://
www.iipi.org/eng/projects/aids.asp (discussing relative poverty of populations in
developing countries as barrier to stimulating market demands). For a discussion
of current donation programs, see supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of pharmaceutical advances, see supra note 4 and ac-
companying text.
182. See Doctors Without Borders, HIV/AIDS Medicines Pricing Report. Setting
Objectives: Is There a Political Will? (Dec. 1, 2000), at n.3 (noting that introduction of
antiretrovirals in wealthy countries has significantly decreased mortality from
AIDS), available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=
49200113585&contenttype& (last visited Dec. 19, 2001).
183. See id. ("Data from the U.S. illustrates that... antiretroviral therapy has
reduced AIDS-related mortality by 75% and morbidity by 73% over a period of 3
years.").
184. See Doctors Without Borders, World AIDS Day 2000 Fact Sheet, at http://
www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/wad2000.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001)
(listing facts about AIDS epidemic).
185. For a further discussion of protecting rights, see supra note 80 and ac-
companying text.
186. For further discussion of AIDS epidemic, see supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text.
187. See TRIPs, supra note 6, at 651 (creating international protection of intel-
lectual property rights).
188. See id. at 591 (recognizing that "intellectual property rights are private
rights").
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The time has come for the TRIPs Council and DSB to review TRIPs
and either modify it to fit the current AIDS pandemic or develop an in-
quiry to determine when a country can declare a national emergency,
thereby invoking TRIPs exceptions such as compulsory licensing.' 8 9 In
addition to clarifying TRIPs, both the developed and developing world
should come together and negotiate a long-term solution to the problem
of access to essential medicines in developing countries.1 90
Michelle M. Nerozzi
189. For a discussion on modifying TRIPs and establishing an inquiry as to
what constitutes a national emergency, see supra notes 128-51 and accompanying
text.
190. See Nessman, supra note 9, at Al (noting that South African government
cannot afford widespread program to provide AIDS medication to 4.7 million in-
fected with HIV). For a discussion on developing a test program to create a long-
term solution, see supra notes 123-80 and accompanying text.
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